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FEDERAL TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES: THE EVOLUTION OF A
TAX LAW RESPONDING TO CHANGE
by
Keith A. Tucker,* J. Dale Dawson,* and Thomas M. Brown*
OR more than two decades, life insurance companies have been
taxed under the provisions of the Life Insurance Company Income
Tax Act of 1959 (1959 Act), as amended.' This legislation, pains-
takingly drafted in the 1950s, offered a scheme of taxation that took into
account the unique and complex nature of the life insurance business and
the delicate competitive balance between stock and mutual life insurance
companies. Despite their assiduous efforts, the drafters did not anticipate
the spiraling inflation, volatile interest rates, and competitive financial
service industry of the 1970s and 1980s. Assailed by such environmental
changes, the comprehensive and balanced taxing formula embodied in the
1959 Act has become distorted, biased, and inadequate.
A 1981 Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congress dis-
cussed the scheme of taxation of the life insurance industry.2 This report
prompted vigorous response by the Treasury, Congress, and the life insur-
ance industry. In August 1982 Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act (TEFRA),3 which included several permanent and
some stopgap provisions designed to correct perceived abuses and distor-
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Texas; C.P.A., Texas. Partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co.
** B.B.A., M.P.A., University of Texas; C.P.A., Texas. Partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co.
*** B.B.A., University of Oklahoma; C.P.A., Texas. Partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co.
Without the assistance of Shari D. Robertson of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the prep-
aration of this Article would not have been possible.
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which is codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
Internal Revenue Code sections are cited to the 1976 permanent edition and/or current
supplement of the United States Code, if therein. Otherwise, code sections are cited to the
main edition and/or current supplement of the United States Code Annotated published by
West Publishing Company. All Treasury Regulations are cited by section number and may
be found in 26 C.F.R. (1983) unless otherwise indicated.
1. I.R.C. §§ 801-820 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (subchapter L, part I).
2. U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, BIL-
LIONS OF DOLLARS ARE INVOLVED IN TAXATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY-
SOME CORRECTIONS IN THE LAW ARE NEEDED (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO
CONGRESS].
3. Pub. L. No. 97-428, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
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tions in the taxation of life insurance companies and raise additional reve-
nue from the life insurance industry. Currently Congress is debating new
comprehensive legislation that will overhaul the taxation of the life insur-
ance industry. This Article discusses the unique characteristics of the life
insurance industry that must be addressed by new tax legislation, and ex-
amines the current tax structure and proposed alternatives in light of these
factors.
I. BACKGROUND
Although life insurance companies are similar to banks and other thrift
institutions, the life insurance industry is an industry different from any
other. A life insurance policy is a contract that provides that the company
will receive a premium in exchange for its obligation to pay benefits on the
occurrence of an event in the future. 4 Although the timing of the future
event is unpredictable for any particular contract, the time can be esti-
mated with some degree of accuracy for a large number or block of con-
tracts. Accordingly, life insurance companies typically set aside an
amount for future liabilities, known as reserves, based on the predictability
of the occurrence of such events for a large block of contracts. 5 Life insur-
ance companies attempt to fund the reserve amount so that the initial re-
serve amount plus investment growth is sufficient to cover predicted
liabilities as they mature.6
The fundamental concept underlying the taxation of corporations,
which generally holds that gross income minus expenses equals taxable
income, does not produce suitable results when applied without modifica-
tion to life insurance companies.7 The life insurance industry is unique in
many ways. First, life insurance contracts are long term in nature. An
insurance company may write an insurance policy that commits it to pay
benefits several years in the future. A life insurance company's true eco-
nomic income for any twelve-month period is therefore difficult to deter-
mine because of the numerous assumptions and estimates required.
4. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, PRINCIPLES OF LIFE INSURANCE 73 (rev. ed. 1975).
5. Guadiana, Federal Income Taxation of Life Insurance Companies.- The Lfe Insur-
ance Reserve, 30 TAx L. REV. 173 (1975).
6. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 4, at 68.
7. One enlightened congressman observed:
There are three basic and fundamental reasons for the difficulty in taxing life
insurance companies. The first reason is that the companies write contracts
which commit them to make payments as far into the future as 100 years....
A second special aspect of life insurance is that so far as its long-run opera-
tions are concerned, a life insurance company is similar to a bank. . . . The
problem is that this banking operation is so intertwined with the pure insur-
ance operation that it is difficult to determine what investment income does go
to the policyholders and what part goes to the company and in the case of a
stock company, to the shareholder.
The third reason why the taxation of life insurance companies has been
difficult over the years is that in this one industry. . . the overwhelming bulk
of the business is done by cooperative organizations.
105 CONG. REC. 2566 (1959) (statement of Rep. Mills).
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Second, Congress has recognized the social benefits of insurance. Spe-
cifically, insurance companies directly support the health and stability of a
society's basic unit, the family, by providing the family with financial se-
curity in a time of great need. Insurance also provides liquidity in estate
planning, security for creditors, and funds for college education and old
age retirement. Fundamentally, life insurance protects against possible
economic loss because of the death of an individual, whether the decedent
is a key executive or a family member.
Finally, life insurance companies have significant influence on the sav-
ings patterns of both individuals and businesses. Savings may take the
form of a savings account at a local financial institution or an insurance
policy issued by an insurance company. These savings are accumulated by
the financial institutions and injected back into the economic bloodstream
of the nation in the form of investments that aid economic expansion. The
insurance industry is a major source of investment funds for corporate
bonds and mortgages, government bonds, real estate, and other invest-
ments. As investors, insurance companies have a considerable influence
on the stability of the nation's economy. Over the years Congress has
attempted to design a taxation scheme that recognizes both the social and
economic benefits provided by life insurance companies.
II. THE HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TAXATION
A. The Pre-1959 Scheme of Taxation
Historically, Congress has recognized, at least in part, the unique nature
of the life insurance industry. During the period from 1909 to the present,
Congress devised several tax schemes for the insurance industry. The 1909
and 1913 Tax Acts subjected life insurance companies to the general tax
imposed on all corporations, but the companies could take a deduction for
reserve increases required by state law.8 In 1921 Congress adopted a fun-
damentally different method of taxation for life insurance companies,
which abandoned the total income approach inherent in the 1909 and 1913
Acts and adopted an investment income approach.
Under the 1921 Act life insurance companies were taxed on their "free
investment income," defined as the investment income remaining after de-
ducting from total investment income the increase in the company's
reserves.9 This increase was calculated in several different ways during the
period from 1921 to 1951. For example, the Revenue Act of 1942 required
each company to report actual reserve requirements to the Secretary of the
Treasury.10 Based upon data collected, the Treasury Department pub-
lished annually a ratio, known as the "Secretary's ratio," of the reserve
requirements to total investment income. Companies then multiplied their
8. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
9. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 245, 42 Stat. 227, 261.
10. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 201(c)(2), 56 Stat. 798, 868.
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
investment income by this ratio to determine what amount of income was
excludable from taxable income.
In later years Congress determined that this method of taxation did not
produce sufficient tax revenues from the insurance industry I and enacted
a series of stopgap measures effective for the years 1949 to 1957. During
this period various industry groups conducted studies regarding life insur-
ance company taxation.' 2 Finally, in 1954 Congress began the process of
writing permanent legislation concerning taxation of life insurance compa-
nies, which resulted in the 1959 Act.' 3
B. The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959
The 1959 Act abandoned the investment income approach and replaced
it with a total income approach that taxed both investment income and
underwriting income.' 4 The total income approach of the 1959 Act embod-
ied a three-phase taxing scheme. Further, Congress sought to define life
insurance companies for federal income tax purposes.' 5 The 1959 Act ad-
ded section 801,16 which defines a life insurance company as follows:
[T]he term "life insurance company" means an insurance company
which is engaged in the business of issuing life insurance and annuity
contracts (either separately or combined with health and accident in-
surance), or noncancellable contracts of health and accident insur-
ance, if-
(1) its life insurance reserves .... plus
(2) unearned premiums, and unpaid losses (whether or not ascer-
11. For instance, in 1947 and 1948, the industry-wide averages produced an exclusion
in excess of 100%, resulting in no appreciable tax from life insurance companies.
12. These studies indicated, among other things, a significant shift from whole life to
term insurance. At that time the largest single component of term business was group insur-
ance. The congressional reports point out that this business involves very little investment
income and thus a "tax based exclusively on investment activity can produce fantastic re-
sults in relation to the operations of the whole company." 105 CONG. REC. 2567 (1959)
(statement of Rep. Mills).
13. Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112. The 1959 Act is actually a misnomer in that it
applied to tax years 1958 and following. I.R.C. § 802(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
14. The 1959 Act required life insurance companies to use the accrual method of ac-
counting for tax purposes. Id § 818(a)(1) (1976); see S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
775 (1959), reprinted in 1959-2 C.B. 770, 793. Furthermore, I.R.C. § 818(a)(2) (1976) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.818-2(a)(2) allow life insurance companies to combine the accrual method
with other special accounting practices provided elsewhere in the Code, including deprecia-
tion, I.R.C. § 167 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983); research and experimental, id § 174; organiza-
tional expenses, id § 248 (1976); and income from installment sales, id § 453B (West Supp.
1983). Except for these basic provisions, however, all tax computations must be made in a
manner consistent with that required for purposes of the annual statement approved by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). I.R.C. § 818(a) (1976). The
relationship between statutory accounting practices and determination of taxable income
has frequently been litigated. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
433 U.S. 148 (1977) (portion of unpaid premiums required by state law to be added to re-
serve, but not portion used to pay commissions, state taxes, and overhead, are included in
assets and gross premium income).
15. The following discussion relates to the 1959 Act, as amended, prior to TEFRA.
16. I.R.C. § 801 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tained), on noncancellable life, health or accident policies not
included in life insurance reserves,
comprise more than 50 percent of its total reserves .... 17
This definition contains a three-part test. First, the company must meet
the definition of an insurance company.18 Second, the company must en-
gage in the business of issuing life insurance and annuity contracts or non-
cancellable contracts, including guaranteed renewable contracts, of health
and accident insurance. 19 Third, the company's life insurance reserves 20
must comprise more than fifty percent of its total reserves. 21
While Congress sought to tax life insurance companies on their total
income, the lawmakers still recognized the problem of designing a scheme
of taxation "that would take into account the difficulty of measuring profit
on long-run business and the difficulty created by the predominant posi-
tion of the large mutual companies."'22 To account for these difficulties,
Congress devised a three-phase tax structure. Phase I involves the deter-
mination of "free investment income" or taxable investment income. 23
Unlike prior law, the portion of investment income excludable for federal
taxation purposes is determined on a company-by-company basis rather
than on the basis of an industry-wide average. Phase II involves under-
writing income or gain from operations. 24 If underwriting income is less
than taxable investment income, underwriting income becomes the tax
base. If underwriting income exceeds taxable investment income, then
one-half of such excess is added to taxable investment income to determine
17. Id § 801(a) (1976).
18. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1). Insurance must be the primary and predominant
business of the company. The existence of a state license and charter to do business as an
insurance company is not determinative. Id
19. I.R.C. § 801(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(b). In defining a contract of insurance
the courts and the IRS have focused on the fundamental concept of insurance, shifting the
risk of loss. An insurance contract must shift or spread the loss to be qualified as such. In
Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941), the Supreme Court held that the "elements of
risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential to a life insurance contract. Id at 539.
20. Life insurance reserves are defined as amounts
(A) which are computed or estimated on the basis of recognized mortality
or morbidity tables and assumed rates of interest, and
(B) which are set aside to mature or liquidate, either by payment or rein-
surance, future unaccrued claims arising from life insurance, annuity, and
noncancellable health and accident insurance contracts (including life insur-
ance or annuity contracts combined with noncancellable health and accident
insurance) involving, at the time with respect to which the reserve is com-
puted, life, health or accident contingencies.
I.R.C. § 801(b)(1) (1976); see Treas. Reg. § 1.801-4(a)(1)-(2). Life insurance reserves must
also be required by law except for certain cases not relevant here. I.R.C. § 801(b)(2) (1976);
Treas. Reg. § 1.801-4(a)(3). This definition originated with Justice Clark's opinion in Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1920). Since then the definition of
life insurance reserves has been litigated on numerous occasions. For a detailed discussion
of life insurance reserves, see K. TUCKER & D. VAN MIEGHEM, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INSURANCE COMPANIES (1983).
21. I.R.C. § 801(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(b).
22. 105 CONG. REC. 2567 (1959) (statement of Rep. Mills).
23. I.R.C. § 804(a)(2) (1976).
24. Id § 809(b)(1).
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the tax base.25 In Phase III the other half of the excess of underwriting
income over taxable investment income is added to the policyholder sur-
plus account, a special accumulation account for income on which taxes
have been deferred. The tax on this accumulated or Phase III income is
imposed if the policyholder surplus account is distributed or exceeds cer-
tain limitations.26
Phase I- Taxable Investment Income. Recognizing the potential social
benefit to policyholders, Congress allowed insurance companies to exclude
from the taxable base that portion of investment income on reserves that is
necessary to meet current and future claims of policyholders and benefi-
ciaries. 27 The Phase I tax is therefore designed to be imposed exclusively
on investment income that is not allocated via reserves to policyholders. 28
Although the principle of Phase I income or taxable investment income is
very similar to that of "free investment income" as determined prior to the
1959 Act, the computation of the two amounts differs substantially.
Taxable investment income is an amount, not less than zero, equal to the
excess, if any, of net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss,
plus the sum of the life insurance company's share of every item of invest-
ment yield, reduced by (1) the life insurance company's share of tax-empt
interest, (2) the deduction for dividends received computed with respect to
the life insurance company's share of the dividends received, and (3) the
small business deduction.29 In order to determine taxable investment in-
come, the first step is to compute gross investment income. Gross invest-
ment income includes interest, dividends, rents, royalties, net short-term
capital gains, and trade or business income. 30 Trade or business income is
defined as gross income from any trade or business, other than an insur-
ance business, carried on by the life insurance company or by a partner-
ship in which the life insurance company is a partner.31 A life insurance
company can deduct from gross investment income certain investment ex-
penses and other related expenses. 32 This net amount is referred to as in-
vestment yield. Once determined, investment yield must be divided into
(1) the policyholders' share, or "policy and other contract liability require-
ments," and (2) the company's share, which constitutes the taxable portion
of the investment yield.33
Section 805(a) defines policy and other contract liability requirements as
25. Id § 802(b).
26. Id Life insurance company taxable income is defined as the sum of "(1) the taxable
investment income . . . or, if smaller, the gain from operations . . . , (2) if the gain from
operations exceeds the taxable investment income, an amount equal to 50 percent of such
excess, plus (3) the amount subtracted from the policyholders surplus account for the taxable
year. ... Id
27. H.R. REP. No. 34, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 738 (1959).
28. H. AARON, A REPORT: TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 14 (1979).
29. I.R.C. § 804(a)(2) (1976).
30. Id § 804(b).
31. Id § 804(b)(3).
32. Id § 804(c).
33. Id § 805(a).
[Vol. 37
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
the sum of: (1) the adjusted life insurance reserves, multiplied by the ad-
justed reserves rate, (2) the mean of the pension plan reserves at the begin-
ning and end of the taxable year, multiplied by the current earning rate,
and (3) the interest paid.34
These components of policy and contract liability requirements may be
referred to as (1) the reserve interest deduction, (2) the pension reserve
deduction, and (3) interest paid, respectively.
A fairly complex formula is used to determine the reserve interest de-
duction. In 1959 Congress adopted a method suggested by Walter 0.
Menge, then president of Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, to
adjust the amount of life insurance reserves35 to be used in computing the
policyholders' share.36 Known as the "Menge formula" or the "10-for-1
formula," this method of adjusting a company's life insurance reserves was
designed in part to account for the difference between the actual earnings
rate of a company and the rate it assumed in setting up reserves.37 Under
the Menge formula adjusted life insurance reserves are equal to the mean
of the life insurance reserves at the beginning and the end of the year mul-
tiplied by a percentage equal to 100% plus 10 times the average interest
rate assumed in computing reserves, less 10 times the adjusted reserves
rate, a rate that reflects the investment return on the insurance company's
assets. 38 This 10-for-I formula results in a 10% reduction in life insurance
reserves for each percentage point by which the adjusted reserves rate ex-
ceeds the average interest rate assumed. The adjusted life reserves are
then multiplied by the adjusted reserves rate to determine the amount allo-
cable to policy and contract liability requirements.
The adjusted reserves rate is the lower of the current earnings rate or the
average earnings rate.39 The current earnings rate is computed by dividing
the current year's investment yield by the mean of the company's assets at
the beginning and end of the tax year.'" The average earnings rate is the
average of the current earnings rate for the current year and for each of the
four immediately preceding tax years.4 '
The policy and contract liability requirements for the second compo-
nent, pension plan reserves, are determined by multiplying the mean of the
pension plan reserves at the beginning and end of the tax year by the cur-
34. Id.
35. These life insurance reserves must also be adjusted to reflect any net level reserve
adjustment under id § 818(c). See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
36. H. AARON, supra note 28, at 15.
37. The House Report indicates a concern on the part of Congress for shifting from an
industry-wide basis to an individual company basis in computing policy and contract liabil-
ity requirements. Because life insurance reserves can differ from company to company
based upon whether the company followed a liberal or conservative policy in establishing
such reserves, Congress adopted a uniform method of determining these reserves for tax
purposes. See H.R. REP. No. 34, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 739 (1959).
38. I.R.C. § 805(e)(1) (1976).
39. Id. § 805(b)(1).
40. Id § 805(b)(2).
41. Id. § 805(b)(3).
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rent earnings rate.42 Pension plan reserves are defined as the life insurance
reserves allocable to certain types of life insurance contracts. 43 Pension
plan reserves are multiplied by the current earnings rate rather than the
adjusted reserves rate,44 which generally results in a greater policyholders'
share, and less taxable investment income, than would be the case if the
10-for-1 formula and the adjusted reserves rate were applied as with other
life reserves. The purpose of this preferential treatment accorded pension
plan reserves was to help relieve what Congress perceived as a discrimina-
tory situation for small employers. Because of the greater risk and higher
administrative cost associated with the operation of a qualified pension or
profit-sharing trust, smaller employers were generally forced to set up in-
sured plans rather than trusteed pension plans. By allowing the policy-
holders' share on pension plan reserves to be computed at the current
earnings rate, life insurance companies became more competitive with
financial institutions that established tax-exempt pension trusts. 45
The third component of policy and other contract liability requirements
42. Id § 805(a).
43. Id. § 805(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Contracts with respect to which reserves qual-
ify as pension plan reserves include those contracts
(1) purchased under contracts entered into with trusts which (as of the
time the contracts were entered into) were deemed to be (A) trusts described in
section 401(a) and exempt from tax under section 501(a), or (B) trusts exempt
from tax under section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 or the corre-
sponding provisions of prior revenue laws;
(2) purchased under contracts entered into under plans which (as of the
time the contracts were entered into) were deemed to be plans described in
section 403(a), or plans meeting the requirements of paragraphs (3), (4), (5),
and (6) of section 165(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939;
(3) provided for employees of the life insurance company under a plan
which, for the taxable year, meets the requirements of paragraphs (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (19), (20), and (22) of section
401(a);
(4) purchased to provide retirement annuities for its employees by an or-
ganization which (as of the time the contracts were purchased) was an organi-
zation described in section 501 (c)(3) which was exempt from tax under section
501(a) or was an organization exempt from tax under section 101(6) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 or the corresponding provisions of prior reve-
nue laws, or purchased to provide retirement annuities for employees de-
scribed in section 403(b)(l)(A)(ii) by an employer which is a State, a political
subdivision of a State, or an agency or instrumentality of any one or more of
the foregoing;
(5) purchased under contracts entered into with trusts which (at the time
the contracts were entered into) were individual retirement accounts described
in section 408(a) or under contracts entered into with individual retirement
annuities described in Section 408(b); or
(6) purchased by-(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of Sec-
tion 414(d)), or (B) the Government of the United States, the government of
any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality
of the foregoing, for use in satisfying an obligation of such government, polit-
ical subdivision, or agency or instrumentality to provide a benefit under a plan
described in subparagraph (A).
Id
44. Id § 805(a)(2) (1976).
45. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 8087 (1959), reprinted in 1959-2 C.B. 775.
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is interest paid.46 Interest paid is defined by section 805(e) as the sum of
(1) interest on indebtedness, (2) amounts in the nature of interest, (3) dis-
count on prepaid premiums, and (4) interest on certain special contingency
reserves. 47 Interest on debt is comparable to interest expense allowed other
taxpayers under section 163.48 Amounts in the nature of interest include
amounts paid or credited, whether or not guaranteed, on insurance or an-
nuity contracts that do not involve, at the time of accrual, life, health, or
accident contingencies. This amount also includes interest on dividends
left on deposit with the company and interest on premiums received in
advance. 49
Investment yield is reduced by the policyholders' share determined
above to arrive at the company's share, or taxable portion, of investment
yield. To arrive at taxable investment income, the company's share of in-
vestment yield is increased by any excess of net long-term capital gain over
net short-term capital loss and is reduced by (1) the company's share of
tax-exempt interest,50 (2) the dividends received deduction for the com-
pany's share of dividends received, 51 and (3) the small business deduc-
tion.52  Recognizing that the insurance industry was dominated by
relatively few large insurance companies, Congress in 1959 added the
small business deduction to aid small and new businesses. 53
Phase I: Underwriting Income (Gain from Operations). Gain from opera-
tions or underwriting income is the second phase of the taxing scheme
adopted in the 1959 Act. Generally underwriting income is the gain or loss
that results from a life insurance company's total operations, including
both the insurance and investment functions of the company. Underwrit-
ing income therefore includes income items such as the life insurance com-
pany's share of each item of investment yield and gross premiums received
on insurance contracts, and expense items such as death benefits paid and
dividends paid to policyholders. 54
46. I.R.C. § 805(a)(3) (1976).
47. Id. § 805(e).
48. Id. § 163 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983). Treas. Reg. § 1.805-8(b)(1), which defines
interest paid for the purpose of determining the policy and other contract liability require-
ment, specifically refers to § 163 and the regulations thereunder.
49. I.R.C. § 805(e)(2) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.805-8(b)(2).
50. Although Congress apparently intended to exclude tax-exempt income from taxable
investment income, the actual result is quite the contrary. Under the 1959 Act only the
company's share of tax-exempt income is excluded from taxable investment income. I.R.C.
§ 804(a)(2)(A) (1976). Although this effectively results in tax on a life insurance company's
tax-exempt income, the requirement that tax-exempt interest be allocated between the poli-
cyholders' share and the company's share was upheld by the Supreme Court in Atlas Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 381 U.S. 233 (1965). For further discussion of the merits of this
result, see H. AARON, supra note 28, at 29-31.
51. I.R.C. § 804(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1976).
52. Id § 804(a)(2)(B). The small business deduction is an amount equal to 10% of in-
vestment yield, but not to exceed $25,000. Id § 804(a)(3).
53. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1959-2 C.B. 770, 776.
54. I.R.C. § 809 (1976). The following is a breakdown of the elements of income and
expense comprising gain from operations:
1984]
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The company's share of investment yield for determining gain from op-
erations in Phase II is computed differently than the company's share of
investment yield for determining taxable investment income in Phase I.
The assumed rate rather than the actual earnings rate is used. The portion
of investment income that is excluded for Phase II purposes is referred to
as required interest and equals the assumed rate of return multiplied by
the mean of the amount of policyholder reserves at the beginning and the
end of the taxable year.55
The 1959 Act allows a deduction in computing gain from operations for
the net increase in reserves.56 Likewise, any decrease in such reserves is
treated as an item of income.57 The reserves are adjusted for the net level
reserve adjustment, as defined below.58 Further, section 810(b) provides
that the increase in reserves is reduced by the required interest, which rep-
resents the Phase II portion of investment yield allocable to
INCOME ELEMENTS
" The life insurance company's share of each item of investment yield, in-
cluding tax-exempt interest and dividends received.
" The amount, if any, of the net capital gain.
* Gross premiums and other consideration received on insurance and annu-
ity contracts, less return premiums.
" Decreases in certain reserves.
• All other amounts includible in gross income.
EXPENSE ELEMENTS
" Death benefits paid.
* Increases in certain reserves.
• Dividends to policyholders.
" Operations loss deduction.
* Special deductions for certain nonparticipating policies, accident and
health insurance policies, and group life policies.
" Consideration incurred for another person's assumption of insurance
liabilities.
" Tax-exempt interest and dividends received deduction.
" Investment expense not allowed in determining taxable investment
income.
" Small business deduction.
" Other deductions.
55. Id. § 809(a)(2). Section 810(c) (1976) defines these reserves as follows:
(1) The life insurance reserves ....
(2) The unearned premiums and unpaid losses included in total reserves
(3) The amounts. . . necessary to satisfy the obligations under insurance
and annuity contracts. . . , but only if such obligations do not involve...
life, health, or accident contingencies.
(4) Dividend accumulations, and other amounts, held at interest in con-
nection with insurance or annuity contracts . ...
(5) Premiums received in advance, and liabilities for premium deposit
funds.
(6) Special contingency reserves under contracts of group term life insur-
ance or group health and accident insurance which are established and main-
tained for the provision of insurance on retired lives, for premium
stabilization, or for a combination thereof.
Id. § 801(c).
56. Id. § 809(d)(2).
57. Id. § 809(c)(2).




A life insurance company may compute its life insurance reserves using
either one of the preliminary term methods or the net level premium
method.60 The preliminary term methods are generally less beneficial to
the company for federal income tax purposes because these methods add a
smaller portion of premium to the reserve in the first year than is required
under the net level method. The amounts not included in the reserve in
the first year are recovered by accumulating larger amounts in later years.
The net level premium method, on the other hand, adds a uniform per-
centage of each year's premium to the reserve.
A company using a preliminary term method generally has smaller pol-
icy reserves than one using the net level premium method. Congress en-
acted section 818(c) to relieve the perceived hardship of companies using a
preliminary term method. 6' That provision permits companies using a pre-
liminary term method to elect to recompute their reserves under the net
level method for all federal income tax purposes, except to meet the defini-
tion of a life insurance company. A life insurance company can recompute
under either an exact or an approximate revaluation. An exact revaluation
is made by computing the preliminary term reserves on the net level pre-
mium basis using the same mortality assumptions and interest rates used
for preliminary term.62 An approximate revaluation is made by adding to
the preliminary term reserves for contracts other than term insurance $21
per $1,000 of insurance in force and by subtracting from that 2.1% of the
related reserves. 63 The factors of $5 per $1,000 of insurance in force and
0.5% of reserves are used for term insurance contracts that cover a period
of more than 15 years. 64 Reserves for term insurance with terms of 15
years or less cannot be revalued. Even if the company elects an approxi-
mate revaluation, it must use exact revaluation for noncancellable and
guaranteed renewable accident and health insurance contracts for which
additional reserves are computed on a preliminary term basis. Whichever
recomputation method is elected, all preliminary term reserves must be
revalued, and the election is binding unless the Internal Revenue Service
grants permission to terminate.65
The most significant advantage in making a section 818(c) 66 election is
that the deduction for reserve increases is accelerated. Additionally, as
59. Id. § 810(b).
60. Id § 818(c).
61. Id
62. Id § 818(c)(1).
63. The $21 per $1000 of insurance in force adjustment represents the rates established
in the 1959 Act. Id § 818(c)(2)(A). This rate was changed to $19 per $1000 of insurance in
force by TEFRA. Id § 818(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1983); see infra notes 194-95 and accompa-
nying text.
64. I.R.C. § 818(c)(2)(B) (1976).
65. The Service has ruled that if the reserves revalued on the approximate basis exceed
those revalued on an exact basis, the reserves are not limited to the amount computed on the
exact basis. Rev. Rul. 77-312, 1977-2 C.B. 235.
66. I.R.C. § 818(c) (1976).
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insurance reserves are increased, the Phase I policyholders' share of invest-
ment yield is generally increased, thus reducing taxable investment in-
come. This election, however, can be disadvantageous for companies
whose total insurance in force, reserved on a preliminary term basis, is not
increasing annually.
Life insurance companies may reduce gain from operations by divi-
dends paid to policyholders and by certain special deductions. Although
not technically a special deduction, dividends to policyholders are grouped
with special deductions because of the limitation applied to all of these
deductions. The 1959 Act limits these deductions to $250,000 plus the ex-
cess of gain from operations, before policyholder dividends and special
deductions are deducted, over taxable investment income.67 Under section
811 (a) dividends to policyholders include "dividends and similar distribu-
tions to policyholders in their capacity as such. '' 68 Amounts properly in-
cluded as interest paid 69 or as return premiums 70 do not constitute
dividends to policyholders, however. The regulations further clarify this
definition by restricting dividends to amounts paid to policyholders that
are not fixed in the contract but depend on the earnings history of the
company or the discretion of management.71
In the 1959 Act Congress, recognizing the unique nature of the insur-
ance business and stock and mutual companies, allowed insurance compa-
nies certain special deductions. The special deductions include (1) the
nonparticipating deduction and (2) the accident and health and group life
deduction. These deductions are called special deductions because they do
not require company outlays. The nonparticipating deduction is equal to
the greater of 10% of the increase in life insurance reserves for nonpartici-
pating policies or 3% of the premiums on nonparticipating contracts.72
The accident and health and group life deduction equals 2% of the premi-
ums on accident and health and group life business. 73 This deduction for
the current year and all preceding years shall not, however, exceed fifty
percent of the premiums for the taxable year attributable to accident and
health insurance and group insurance contracts.
In drafting the 1959 Act the lawmakers encountered a controversy be-
tween the stock companies and the mutual companies regarding the de-
ductibility of policyholder dividends.74 Congress created the
nonparticipating deduction to compensate for an advantage mutual com-
panies enjoyed over stock companies. Since a mutual company's business
is primarily participating, it can charge a higher premium than a stock
67. Id § 809(0.
68. Id § 811(a).
69. Interest paid is separately deductible under id § 805(e).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.811-2(a).
71. Id
72. I.R.C. § 809(d)(5) (1976).
73. Id § 809(d)(6). This deduction is, however, subject to certain limitations. See id
§ 809(0.




company and later return to the policyholder the portion of the premium
that is not needed by the company. The portion of the premium not im-
mediately returned to the policyholder provides the mutual company with
a cushion of funds until the excess is returned. On the other hand, stock
life companies that issue mostly nonparticipating policies must maintain
relatively large surplus and capital accounts to provide them with
equivalent liquid funds. Congress provided stock companies with the non-
participating deduction to compensate for this difference in the operation
of stock and mutual companies.
Phase 111: Surplus Accounts. Under Phases I and II, taxable investment
income and 50% of any excess of gain from operations over taxable invest-
ment income are subject to tax currently. The life insurance company's
taxable income attributable to Phases I and II, net of applicable federal
income tax, together with the full dividends received deduction, all tax-
exempt interest, net long-term capital gains in excess of taxable income,
and the small business deduction are accumulated as a part of the share-
holders' surplus account. 75 Distributions may be made to shareholders out
of this account without additional tax to the company.
The 50% excess of gain from operations over taxable investment income
that is not subject to current taxation, plus the nonparticipating deduction
and the accident and health and group life deductions, are accumulated in
the policyholders' surplus account. 76 Phase III income will occur if this
account exceeds certain statutory limitations77 or if the company makes a
distribution to shareholders, either in cash or in kind, in excess of the
amount in the shareholders' surplus account. 78
Reinsurance. Discussion of federal taxation of life insurance companies
would not be complete without consideration of the tax effects of reinsur-
ance. Reinsurance is an arrangement whereby an insurance company
passes some or all of its policy risks to another insurance company. 79
There are two basic types of reinsurance, assumption reinsurance and in-
denmity reinsurance. Indemnity reinsurance can be divided into three
general forms, yearly renewable term (YRT), coinsurance, and modified
coinsurance. The tax effects of each form of reinsurance vary significantly.
Assumption reinsurance is an arrangement in which the assuming com-
pany, the reinsurer, becomes solely liable to the policyholders on the con-
tracts transferred by the ceding company, the reinsured.80 In general terms
75. I.R.C. § 815(b) (1976).
76. Id § 815(c).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.815-6(d).
78. I.R.C. § 815(0 (1976) defines the term "distribution."
79. In order for a reinsurance agreement to be effective for federal income tax purposes,
a sufficient business purpose must exist and a shifting of the risk of the loss must take place.
See United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 729 (1977); Carnation Co. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400, 403 (1978), affd, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981).
80. I.R.C. § 809(d)(7) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-5(a)(7)(ii).
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the reinsured treats the assumption as a decrease in reserves 8' and ac-
counts for the consideration paid to the reinsurer as a deduction from gain
from operations.82 On the other side of the transaction, the reinsurer is
entitled to a deduction for the reserves assumed.83 The reinsurer includes
the consideration received for assuming the ceding company's reserves in
premium income.84 If any additional consideration or bonus is paid by the
reinsurer to the ceding company for the business assumed, however, it
must be capitalized and amortized as a deferred expense over the reason-
ably estimated life of the contracts reinsured. 85
Indemnity reinsurance is an arrangement in which the ceding company
passes all or a portion of the insured risk to the reinsurer, 86 but remains
primarily liable to the policyholders. Under a typical coinsurance arrange-
ment the following tax consequences accrue to the ceding company and
the reinsurer.
Ceding Company
- Reduces premium income for the premium allocable to the
reinsurer a7
- Reduces its deductions for expenses to the extent they are re-
imbursable by the reinsurer.8 f
- Reduces its deduction for death and other policy benefits to the
extent they are recoverable from the reinsurer.89
- Increases "other income" under section 809(c)(3) for the expe-
rience refunds9° it receives from the reinsurer. 9'
- Reduces its deduction for policyholder dividends to the extent
they are reimbursable by the reinsurer. 92
- Increases income under section 809(c)(2) for the decrease in its
reserves attributable to the reinsurance transaction.93
Reinsurer
- Includes its share of the ceding company's premium in pre-
mium income.94
81. I.R.C. § 809(c)(2) (1976).
82. Id § 809(d)(7).
83. Id § 809(d)(2).
84. Id § 809(c)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.809-4(a)(1)(i); 1.817-4(d)(2)(ii)(A). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.809-4(a)(1)(i) was declared invalid to the extent it requires different treatment of unpaid
premiums. Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 160-63
(1976).
85. I.R.C. § 809(d)(1) (1976); Treas. Re*. § 1.817-4(d)(2)(ii)(B). Prior to the issuance of
this regulation in 1976, considerable uncertainty existed as to the deductibility of bonus paid
for acquiring a block of insurance contracts.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(l)(iii).
87. I.R.C. § 809(c)(1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1).
88. I.R.C. § 809(c)(3) (1976).
89. Id § 809(d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-5(a)(1).
90. Experience refunds are rebates to the ceding company from the reinsurer based on
the history of claims on the ceded policies.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(3).
92. I.R.C. § 820(c)(5) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.820-3(a)(7).
93. I.R.C. § 809(c)(2) (1976).
94. Id § 809(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1).
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- Deducts its share of policy benefits due the ceding company. 95
- Deducts any expenses for which it must reimburse the ceding
company.96
- Treats experience refunds payable to the ceding company as
return premiums.97
- If the reinsurer reimburses the ceding company for policy-
holder dividends, it deducts an amount for such dividends
under section 809(d)(3). 98
- Deducts as an increase in reserves the reserves established for
the risk assumed under the reinsurance contract. 99
Modified coinsurance is a form of indemnity reinsurance in which, un-
like coinsurance, the ceding company retains ownership of the assets and
maintains the reserves for the risks assumed by the reinsurer. The ceding
company remains liable to the policholders just as it does with coinsurance
and yearly renewable term reinsurance. The ceding company pays the
reinsurer the proportionate share of the policy premiums less the rein-
surer's share of expenses. The reinsurer reimburses the ceding company
for the reinsurer's share of policy benefits. At year end the reinsurer typi-
cally pays the ceding company an amount necessary to maintain the policy
reserves. This amount is reduced, however, by the amount of investment
income that the reinsurer would have earned if it held the assets.
The tax consequences to the ceding company and the reinsurer of a
modified coinsurance arrangement are similar to those attributable to a
coinsurance arrangement, with the following exceptions. For the ceding
company, the increase in reserve deduction under section 809(d)(2) as to
the reinsured policies is retained because no assets or reserves are trans-
ferred. Likewise, the reinsurer does not realize a decrease in reserves
under section 809(c)(2) since no assets or reserves are transferred. Also, for
the ceding company, amounts paid by the reinsurer to maintain the ceding
company's policy reserves, net of interest, are treated as premium in-
come. l°° Likewise, the reinsurer decreases premium income for these
amounts. 01 Since the ceding company maintains the assets and reserves
under modified coinsurance, the investment income is taxed to the ceding
company, even though the reinsurer has received an economic benefit for
the investment earnings through an adjustment to reserves for the amount
of the investment earnings. On the other hand, the reserve interest adjust-
ment, which benefits the reinsurer, is includable in the reinsurer's gain
from operations.' 02 Under this analysis this amount would be doubly
taxed, once as investment income to the ceding company and once as gain
from operations to the reinsurer.
95. I.R.C. § 809(d)(1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-5(a)(1).
96. I.R.C. § 809(d)(1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.809-5(a)(12).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(ii).
98. I.R.C. § 820(c)(5) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.820-3(a)(7).
99. I.R.C. § 809(d)(2) (1976).
100. Id. § 809(c)(1).
101. Id
102. Id § 809(c)(2).
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To avoid this result, Congress enacted section 820, which provides that
the ceding company and the reinsurer can elect to treat modified coinsur-
ance as if it were conventional coinsurance.10 3 Although assets and
reserves are not actually transferred from the ceding company to the rein-
surer in a modified coinsurance arrangement, they are treated as trans-
ferred for federal income tax purposes if the section 820 election is made.
Summary. The 1959 Act was the culmination of over a decade of efforts
by Congress and the life insurance industry to devise a taxing structure
that would fairly and equitably tax the income of that industry. The au-
thors of this legislation recognized, at least in part, the unique nature of the
life insurance industry and the social and economic benefits provided by
the industry. They also considered the competitive balance, as well as the
inherent difference, between the stock companies and the mutual compa-
nies. The drafters also recognized the plight of the small stock life insur-
ance company in the 1950s. The result was perhaps one of the most
complicated pieces of tax legislation ever enacted.
Since that time various groups both within and without the life insur-
ance industry have sharply criticized the 1959 Act. While Congress
designed the 1959 Act to support the social benefits of insurance by provid-
ing somewhat preferential tax treatment, Congress is now more keenly
aware of the need to raise additional revenue in light of current budget
deficits. Thus Congress faces two competing objectives, encouraging those
who provide financial security to society and collecting additional revenue
to narrow widening budget deficits. Further, certain provisions of the 1959
Act do not provide reasonable and predictable results for current economic
transactions involving the life insurance industry. Specifically, as pointed
out in the recent GAO Report, the Menge formula for determining the
reserve deduction for the policyholders' share of reserve increases does not
provide reasonable results in a period of high interest rates. 0 4 Addition-
ally, the $250,000 limitation on policyholder dividends and special deduc-
tions does not adequately reflect the effect of inflation since 1959. The
ability of the new investment-oriented products now being introduced by
life insurance companies to compete with other investment alternatives de-
pends on a grant of favorable tax treatment by Congress. The framers of
the 1959 Act were clearly unable to conceptualize and address the proper
taxation of these new products. Taxation of these products must, however,
take into account increasing competition among and decreasing differences
between members of the financial services industry. Finally, critics of the
1959 Act have urged simplification of taxation of the life insurance indus-
try. Some proponents have called for a single-phase tax structure very
similar to that imposed on other corporations.
103. Id § 820(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.820-2(a).
104. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 85-87.
[Vol. 37
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
III. THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY AND REPORT
In response to perceived changes in the life insurance industry over the
past twenty years, the Government Accounting Office conducted an exam-
ination of the 1959 Act and proposed to Congress certain alterations. The
GAO Report recommended three specific changes in the 1959 Act and
identified six additional issues for study by Congress.105 Perhaps the most
significant result of the study was that it alerted Congress to the need for
reform in taxation of life insurance companies and prompted extensive re-
sponse from various sectors of the industry. The following discussion out-
lines the study and the findings of the GAO.
A4. The Bases of the GAO Study
The GAO based its study on literature available on the life insurance
industry and surveys and discussions with the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation and representatives of various industry trade associations. 106
In August 1979 the GAO hosted a conference of industry representatives
and tax experts. In addition, the GAO accumulated tax data on a sample
of the largest life insurance companies for the period 1974-1978.107 The
GAO Report identified the following as major changes that have occurred
in the life insurance industry since 1959. First, while the bulk of the larg-
est life insurance companies are mutual companies, mutual companies no
longer dominate the industry in terms of total assets and total number of
companies.108 Second, life insurance sales have largely shifted from
whole-life to term policies.1°9 Third, life insurance companies have filled
105. Id.
106. These included the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and the National
Association of Life Companies (NALC).
107. REPORT TO CONoRESS, supra note 2, at 4. While the GAO Report examined several
key issues affecting the life insurance industry, the following issues were intentionally over-
looked in their study:
-- the propriety of allowing companies a current deduction for additions to
policyholders' reserves rather than postponing the deduction until benefits
are paid... ;
-the extent to which the omission from the individual income tax base of
amounts credited by the company to policyholders' reserves (the "inside
buildup") should affect the structure of company-level taxation;
-the possibility of attributing company earnings to policyholders and taxing
them at the individual level as a substitute for company-level taxation;
-the question of whether special offsets should be allowed during an infla-
tionary period against taxes imposed on returns to capital, whether the re-
cipients are life insurance companies, other companies or entities, or
individuals;
-the propriety of bending tax policy to respect the "competitive balance".
between stock companies and mutual companies within the life insurance
industry; and
-- the relevance today of certain social and economic objectives that were ex-
pressed in the 1959 Act.
Id at 3.
108. Id. at 29.
109. Id. at 20.
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an increased role in the pension business. 110
Mutual Versus Stock Companies. Large mutual insurance companies have
typically dominated the life insurance industry. When the 1959 Act was
written mutual companies held approximately two-thirds of the insurance
in force and three-fourths of the assets in the life insurance industry."'I In
1980 mutual companies held approximately 50% of the insurance in force
and approximately 60% of the assets in the industry. "12 Mutual companies
represent 7% of the total number of life insurance companies.' 13 Thus,
while the relative dominance of the mutual companies appears to be de-
clining, they remain a dominant force within the industry.
Whole Life Versus Term Insurance. In recent years term insurance has
increased in popularity due to its lower cost in the insured's younger
years.114 Whole life insurance has correspondingly experienced a decline
in market share. The following table provides a comparison of whole life
and term insurance in force for selected years.
Face Value of Life Insurance in Force
in United States, Selected Years, 1957- 77115
(dollar amounts in billions)
Term Insurance Permanent Insurance
As Percent As Percent
Year Amount of Total Amount of Total
1957 $ 208 45% $ 256 55%
1962 341 51 334 49
1966 549 56 436 44
1974 1,246 63 740 37
1977 1,680 65 903 35
Pensions. As a vehicle for saving, private pension plans, both insured and
uninsured, have increased substantially in volume over the last thirty
years. For example, total pension assets in 1952 were $17.5 billion.11 6 By
1978, this amount had increased to $317.7 billion. 117 Likewise, total pen-
sion assets held by life insurers in 1952 were $7.7 billion, 1 8 while by 1978
110. Id at 24.
111. REPORT TO HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS BY SUBCOMM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE, TAXATION 85TH CONG. 2D SESS., TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 291
(1958).
112. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1981 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 90 (1981).
113. Id
114. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 20.
115. Data compiled from AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK
1979, at 22 (1979), and AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1968, at 25
(1968).





this amount equalled $119.1 billion."19 The GAO Report noted the
growth in pension activity by life insurance companies as a significant
change in the industry and attributed this change, at least in part, to the
favorable tax treatment accorded insured pension funds.' 20
The Nature of the Life Insurance Industry. The GAO Report identified
three basic characteristics of the industry that are important to the devel-
opment of a fair and equitable taxing scheme.' 2' First, the long-term na-
ture of the insurance business makes measurement of income on an annual
basis difficult.' 22 The GAO Report pointed out that Congress, recognizing
this characteristic, allowed a deduction for reserve additions in the 1959
Act.' 23 Moreover, the accounting methods used to determine the taxable
income of a life insurance company are substantially different from the
accounting methods used by other companies, which usually conform to
generally accepted accounting principles. The GAO also noted that Con-
gress considered the long-term nature of the insurance business in allowing
deferral of one-half of the excess of gain from operations over taxable in-
vestment income.' 24 This deferral was essentially designed to provide a
cushion for life insurance companies in the event of catastrophic losses.
Second, life insurance companies generally set aside a portion of annual
investment income to meet future reserve requirements. The GAO Report
noted the inherent difficulty in accurately determining the portion of in-
vestment income that should be set aside for policyholders, and therefore
not subject to current taxation, versus the portion that should be currently
taxed to the company. 125 Recognizing that a company's actual earnings
rate often differs from its assumed rate in computing reserves, Congress in
the 1959 Act devised a method of determining the policyholders' share of
investment income based on adjusted life reserves, which are computed on
the basis of the company's actual earnings rate.
Third, the insurance industry's composition of both mutual and stock
companies defies development of one scheme of taxation that will equita-
bly tax each group. 126 The GAO Report discussed the problems Congress
faced in fashioning the 1959 Act in a manner that fairly and equitably
apportioned the tax burdens between stock and mutual companies. 127 The
main object of controversy was the treatment accorded policyholder divi-
dends. The report recognized that mutual companies are viewed as coop-
erative organizations, wherein the policyholders serve the multiple roles of
creditors, customers, and owners.' 28 Under current law dividends paid by
119. Id
120. Id. at 24-27.
121. Id at 30-31.
122. Id at 30.
123. Id at 36-37.
124. Id at 37.
125. ld at 37-38.
126. Id at 39-40.
127. Id
128. Id. at 39.
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mutual companies are treated as premium rebates for tax purposes. In
stock companies, on the other hand, the owners are the stockholders, who
may or may not also be policyholders, and dividends are deemed to be a
distribution of income. The report emphasized the need "to recognize the
different organizational structures and devise a formula that taxes mutual
and stock companies in a fair and equitable way."' 29 In drafting the 1959
Act Congress developed a compromise formula that limited the deduction
for policyholder dividends to the excess of gain from operations over taxa-
ble investment income, plus $250,000. The GAO Report states that this
compromise formula resulted in the mutual companies paying 69% of the
tax burden in 1958.130 The 69% ratio was presumably determined by aver-
aging the mutual companies' share of all life insurance in force, 63%, with
its share of industry assets, 75%.131
B. The Examination of Specifc Pro visions of the 1959 4t'132
The GAO Report examined certain specific provisions of the 1959 Act
and formulated various alternatives to these provisions. The areas ex-
amined included (1) the effect of the 1959 Act on a life insurance com-
pany's investment decisions, (2) policy and other contract liability
requirements, (3) the interplay of the three-phase tax structure, and (4) net
level adjustment to life insurance reserves.
Life Insurance Company Investments. Any tax policy that affects the taxa-
tion of a company's investment income will affect a company's investment
decisions. Two areas affected by the 1959 Act are tax-exempt securities
and discount bonds. Under the 1959 Act tax-exempt interest earned by a
life insurance company is not fully tax-exempt. This interest, along with
taxable interest and other investment income, is prorated between the
policyholders and the company.' 33 Only the portion prorated to the com-
pany is excludable as tax-exempt interest. This tax policy discourages in-
vestment in tax-exempt issues since a life insurance company does not
benefit from a 100% exclusion of the income earned on tax-exempt
securities.
The 1959 Act, as amended, further provides that life insurance compa-
nies can elect not to amortize market discount on bonds as ordinary in-
129. Id
130. Id at 40.
131. Clark, The Federal Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1649
(1975).
132. This section is a summary of the GAO's findings with regard to specific provisions
of the 1959 Act. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 50-71. Opinions expressed in
this section do not necessarily reflect those of the authors.
133. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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come.134 As a result, bond discount can be treated as capital gain income
when the bonds are sold or retired. In the late 1970s and early 1980s many
corporate bonds were significantly discounted because of spiraling interest
rates.' 35 These bonds have therefore been particularly attractive to life
insurance companies because of this advantageous tax treatment.
Although the GAO Report described in detail the effect of the 1959 Act
on investment decisions regarding tax-exempt securities and discount
bonds, 136 the report did not suggest any alternatives for Congress to con-
sider, nor did it request Congress to perform additional studies of these
issues.
Policy and Other Contract Liability Requirements. Life insurance compa-
nies may deduct from investment income an amount for policy and other
contract liability requirements in order to arrive at taxable investment in-
come. 137 Policy and other contract liability requirements consist of (1) the
reserve interest deduction, (2) the pension reserve deduction, and (3) inter-
est paid. As previously discussed, the reserve interest deduction is based
on the 10-for-I or Menge formula. The GAO Report recognized that the
Menge formula is "one of the most controversial provisions of the 1959
Act."' 38 The 10-for-1 formula was intended to result in a reasonable ap-
proximation of the company's reserves based on its actual earnings rate,
and is apparently a fairly accurate indicator of a company's reserve needs
when the difference between the adjusted reserves rate and the average
rate of interest is small. As the difference increases, however, the 10-for-1
formula results in more unrealistic adjusted life insurance reserves and
marginal tax rates on additional investment income that can exceed the
maximum corporate rate of 46%. Given today's high interest rates, cou-
pled with an assumed rate of 3% or 4%, the difference between these rates
can be significant.' 39 The GAO Report recommended that Congress
134. I.R.C. § 818(b) (1976).
135. These bonds were commonly referred to as "deep discount" bonds.
136. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 50-51.
137. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
138. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 53.
139. The GAO study describes this result as follows:
The relationship between the reserve deduction that is allowed under the
10-to-I approximation and the interest deduction based on the assumed rate is
a portion of a parabolic curve, starting from 100 percent when the two rates
are equal and increasing to a maximum (halfway between the assumed rate
and 10 percent) and then decreasing to 100 percent again when the adjusted
earnings rate equals 10 percent. However, the curve does not stop there. For
adjusted earnings rates in excess of 10 percent, the reserve deduction allowed
by the Menge formula actually becomes less than 100 percent of the required
interest until it disappears entirely, if and when the adjusted earnings rate
exceeds the assumed rate by 10 percent or more ....
Id at 55. The result described by the study can be depicted as follows:
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adopt one of three alternatives to the 10-for-I or Menge formula. 140 First,
Congress could substitute the actual required interest based on assumed
rates for the 10-for-1 adjustment. This is known as the "free interest"
method. Second, a reserve deduction based on a geometric approximation
could replace the 10-for-I rule. Third, Congress could substitute a 4.5%
maximum for the average earnings rate with either the 10-for-i reserve
adjustment or with the geometric reserve adjustment.
Under the free interest method, a life insurance company substitutes its
required interest, determined by multiplying the assumed rate by the mean
life reserves, for its reserve interest deduction.' 4' Since companies set pre-
miums based upon expected earnings rates rather than the lower assumed
rates mandated by states to determine reserves, industry observers believe
that this method results in a perceived inequity. The geometric approxi-
mation method assumes that for a difference of "n" percent between the
actual and assumed earnings rates, the level of reserves decreases by 0.9 to
the nth power.' 42 Because geometric approximation provides a larger re-
serve interest deduction under current economic conditions, this method
has gained the widest industry support. The 4.5% maximum method as-
sumes a maximum adjusted reserves rate of 4.5% and can be used in con-
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junction with either the 10-for-i formula or the geometric
approximation. ' 43 The 4.5% maximum method, therefore, places an upper
limitation on the reserve interest deduction. The following chart included
in the GAO Report shows the relationship between these three methods.' 44
A Graphic Presentation of Effective Reserve Interest Deduction
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Interplay of the Three-Phase Tax Structure. As previously discussed, a life
insurance company is taxed on the lesser of taxable investment income or
gain from operations, plus 50% of the excess, if any, of gain from opera-
tions over taxable investment income. The GAO Report noted two spe-
cific concerns regarding this taxing scheme. First, the report discussed the
use of modified coinsurance arrangements. 45 Under a modified coinsur-
ance arrangement, a company taxed on Phase I income transfers a block of
insurance business reserved on a preliminary term basis to a reinsuring
company taxed on Phase II income. Assuming a section 820 election is
made, the ceding company reduces its investment income, and thus its tax
base, by an amount equal to the earnings on the assets transferred. The
reinsurer, on the other hand, assumes assets equal to the statutory reserves
and therefore recognizes premium income equal to its deduction for the
increase in statutory reserves. Further, if the reinsurer has elected to re-
143. Id. at 91.
144. Id. at 93.
145. Id. at 62.
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value its reserves under section 818(c), it will also receive a deduction for
the revalued amount on the reserves assumed, resulting in a net reduction
in its underwriting income and thus its tax base. 146 The GAO Report
notes that the multi-phase taxing scheme made such arrangements advan-
tageous for certain taxpayers. The report did not recommend that section
820 be repealed, however, but stated that Congress would probably do
SO.1
4 7
Second, the GAO questioned the necessity of the 50% deferral of any
excess of gain from operations over taxable investment income. 148 This
provision was provided to protect an insurance company in the case of
unpredictable catastrophic losses. The GAO contended that losses are ac-
tually highly predictable and that no deferral is necessary. The GAO also
argued that the deferral favors stock companies rather than mutual com-
panies. Consequently, the GAO recommended that the deferral of one-
half of gain from operations over taxable investment income be phased
out. 149
Net Level Election. As previously discussed, the 1959 Act provided two
methods of revaluing preliminary term reserves for the purpose of comput-
ing the Phase II deduction for the net increase in reserves, exact revalua-
tion and approximate revaluation. °50 Under the approximate revaluation
method preliminary term whole life reserves were increased by $21 per
$1,000 of insurance in force, less 2.1% of the reserves. The GAO con-
tended that this approximate revaluation resulted in a reserve greater than
that computed by an exact revaluation. As a result, the GAO recom-
mended that the approximate revaluation be reduced from $21 to $15 per
$1,000 of insurance in force. 15'
Additional Areas of Study. In addition to specific recommendations, the
GAO recommended that Congress study six additional provisions: 52
(1) deferred annuities;
(2) the definition of a life insurance company;
(3) the definition of life insurance reserves;
(4) the deduction for investment expenses;
(5) the definition of assets; and
(6) the use of modified coinsurance for tax avoidance.
146. See I.R.C. § 820 (1976); supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
147. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 63. Section 820 was, in fact, repealed by
TEFRA. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
148. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 63; see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text.
149. Id at 104.
150. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.




IV. THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
ACT OF 1982 (TEFRA)
On September 3, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.153 The life insurance and annuity
provisions of TEFRA significantly affect not only the federal income tax
treatment of life insurers and their products, but also the taxation of the
consumers of such products. These provisions reflect a compromise
among the life insurance industry, the Treasury Department, and various
congressional committees. TEFRA contains a number of stopgap provi-
sions effective only for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981,
and before January 1, 1984. The aim of these provisions is not only to
increase tax revenues from the insurance industry, but also to provide rules
regarding the tax treatment of various new life insurance products.
A. Reinsurance Provisions
Repeal of Mod/fied Coinsurance Provisions (Section 820). Although section
820 was originally intended to avoid possible double taxation of invest-
ment income to both the ceding company and the reinsurer, the Treasury
and others sensed that life insurance companies were using modified coin-
surance arrangements to substantially reduce or eliminate their federal in-
come tax liabilities.1 54 In response to the Treasury's concerns, Congress
repealed section 820 effective for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1981.155 The repeal applies to modified coinsurance contracts entered
into prior to 1982 as well as those entered into after 1981.156
TEFRA does, however, "grandfather" the pre-1982 federal income tax
treatment of modified coinsurance agreements. 157 The eligibility of prior
years for the section 820 treatment is determined "solely by reference to
the terms of the contract."' 58 Accordingly, the pre-1982 federal income tax
savings attributable to modified coinsurance should be free from IRS scru-
tiny. The sole exception to this special treatment is in the case of fraud. 159
Special Termination Accounting. Congress prescribed a series of special
termination accounting rules for modified coinsurance arrangements, one
of which concerned the treatment of assets and reserves as of January 1,
1982. Assets and reserves as of the beginning of 1982 are treated as assets
and reserves of the reinsurer and not of the ceding company, while assets
and reserves as of the end of 1982 are treated as having been returned to
153. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA].
154. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1982).
155. TEFRA § 255(a), 96 Stat. at 533.
156. Id. § 256(f), 96 Stat. at 536. Section 256(f) of TEFRA contains a special election
that allows a ceding company to revoke retroactively a § 820 election for contracts entered
into in 1980 or 1981 with an unrelated reinsurer. The company must have either had loss
from operations or been taxed on gain from operations in the year the contract took effect.




SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
the ceding company. 160 This procedure effectively increases the 1982 taxa-
ble investment income of the ceding company and also reduces the Phase
II tax-exempt interest and dividends received deductions of the reinsurer.
Further, Congress specifically disallows any increase in reserves attributa-
ble to the restoration of reserves to a ceding company to qualify for the
special deduction for nonparticipating contracts.' 6'
The net level reserve adjustment also received special treatment. This
special rule affects both the ceding company and the reinsurer. Under the
general rules a ceding company that recaptures reserves that are subject to
the net level election is entitled to a deduction in the year of recapture
equal to the reserves assumed, including the net level reserve adjustment.
The deduction for the increase in the net level reserve adjustment is not,
however, allowed to the ceding company under the special termination
rules.162 On the other hand, the reinsurer is required to include in taxable
income the decrease in its net level reserve adjustment caused by the repeal
of section 820.163 Congress recognized the additional tax burden resulting
from the special termination rules and thus provided a transitional rule
that allows the reinsurer to pay the increased federal income tax caused by
the release of the net level election reserves over a three-year period. 164
Reimbursed Policyholder Dividends-Conventional Coinsurance. Prior to
TEFRA policyholder dividends reimbursed by a reinsurer under the terms
of a reinsurance contract were considered paid by the reinsurer rather than
by the ceding company. In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. United
States 165 the Court of Claims construed this requirement to mean that a
reinsurer's dividend deduction is limited to amounts actually paid by the
reinsurer. 166 In effect this decision places reinsurers, which are required to
be accrual method taxpayers, on the cash basis method for purposes of
deducting reimbursed dividends. Under TEFRA reimbursed policyholder
dividends under conventional coinsurance are treated as policyholder divi-
dends of the ceding company, 167 and the reimbursed dividends are in-
cluded in premium income of the ceding company. The reinsurer, on the
other hand, is entitled to a full deduction for reimbursed policyholder divi-
dends determined on an accrual basis.' 68 Congress's apparent rationale
for this procedure was that the deductibility of dividends should be deter-
mined by the ceding company.
160. Id. § 256(b), 96 Stat. at 535.
161. Id. § 256(d)(4), 96 Stat. at 535-36.
162. Id. § 256(d)(2), 96 Stat. at 535 (amending I.R.C. §§ 810(a)-(b)). The new law is
silent as to whether the tax benefit rule will apply to exclude from income the decrease in the
net level reserve adjustment when the underlying insurance contracts lapse or terminate.
163. TEFRA § 256(d)(1), 96 Stat. at 535.
164. Id § 256(e), 96 Stat. at 536.
165. 582 F.2d 579 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
166. Id at 603-04.
167. TEFRA § 255(b), 96 Stat. at 533 (adding I.R.C. § 811(c) (West Supp. 1983)).
168. I.R.C. §§ 809(d)(12), 811(c) (West Supp. 1983).
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Other Reinsurance Agreements. A number of life insurers enter into rein-
surance agreements whereby the reinsurer records the reserves assumed on
its annual statement even though the related assets are not transferred to
the reinsurer. Instead, the ceding company transfers a note to the assum-
ing company with a stated rate of interest. This interest is treated as inter-
est paid by the ceding company and reduces taxable investment income.
The new law removes the incentive for this arrangement by disallowing
the interest deduction for any interest paid or accrued after December 31,
1981 by a ceding company to any person in connection with a reinsurance
agreement. 69 This provision does not apply, however, with respect to in-
terest paid on account of delay in making periodic settlements of income
and expense items under the terms of the contract.
TEFRA does not specifically address other reinsurance arrangements.170
Nonetheless, both the Senate Finance Report and the Conference Com-
mittee Report state that in appropriate circumstances the Internal Revenue
Service may properly challenge other reinsurance tax planning arrange-
ments on a number of grounds, including lack of economic substance, lack
of business purpose, or principal purpose of tax evasion.' 71
Related Party Reinsurance. TEFRA added a new provision concerning re-
insurance transactions between related parties.172 Related parties include
those in an affiliated group as well as related foreign entities or casualty
insurance companies. 73 The new provision provides that the IRS may
allocate or recharacterize any item, such as investment income, premiums,
deductions, assets, reserves, or credits, if allocation or recharacterization is
necessary to reflect the proper source and character of taxable income.
B. Policyholder Dividend and Special Deductions Limitation
As part of its stopgap provisions, TEFRA increases the limitations on
the deductibility of policyholder dividends and special deductions and in-
corporates an elective alternative approach that no longer associates the
maximum permitted deduction with the relationship of the tentative gain
from operations to the taxable investment income. The purpose of this
change is to reflect the effect of inflation since 1959, when the existing
amount was established. 74 Under the new limitation a life insurance
169. Id. § 805(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1983).
170. Reinsurance agreements involving asset transfers are, however, covered by pro-
posed regulations issued by the Treasury. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.809-4(a)(1)(ii), 47 Fed. Reg.
11,882 (Mar. 19, 1982). These regulations treat all or a part of a reinsurance experience
refund as investment income to the ceding company and as a reduction of investment in-
come by the assuming company.
171. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 336, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1074; H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 641, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1412.
172. I.R.C. § 818(g) (West Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 258(a)).
173. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 337, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1074.
174. Id at 338, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1075-76.
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company's total deduction for policyholder dividends and special deduc-
tions equals the greater of (1) $1,000,000 plus the excess, if any, of gains
from operations, before policyholder dividends and special deductions,
over taxable investment income, or (2) the alternative limitation, which is
the sum of (a) the policyholder dividends allocable to section 805(d) quali-
fied pension contracts, (b) the base amount, which consists of policyholder
dividends under nonqualified contracts and the deduction for nonpartici-
pating contracts, up to $1,000,000, and (c) for a mutual company, 77.5% of
the base amount; for a stock company, 85% of the base amount.' 75
As indicated above, the statutory amount for policyholder dividends
and special deductions is increased to $1,000,000, both under the original
formula limitation and in the new elective alternative limitation. The
$1,000,000 amount begins to decrease when the total available policy-
holder dividends and special deductions exceed $4,000,000, and it contin-
ues to decline substantially until the sum of such deductions reaches
$8,000,000, after which it no longer applies.' 76 Further, the gradual de-
crease of the $1,000,000 statutory limitation amount is based on the full
amount of policyholder dividends and special deductions, not just on the
base amount. Thus, policyholder dividends on qualified pension contracts
and the potential deduction for certain accident and health and group life
contracts affect computation of the alternative limitation.
At this large company level, the deduction for nonqualified business
would be determined solely under the percentage limitation provision.
This new alternative election can enable unaffiliated stock companies
whose base amount is $5,000,000 or less to realize a tax benefit for 100% of
the policyholder dividends on nonqualified contracts and 100% of the non-
participating contract deduction. For a mutual company, the equivalent
point would be $4,210,000 of nonqualified policyholder dividends. Ac-
cording to the Senate Finance Committee report, the difference in treat-
ment "is intended to reflect that a portion of the dividend distribution to
mutual company policyholders constitutes a return of corporate earnings
to them (deriving from their ownership interest in the company), and ac-
cordingly, should not be deductible."' 177
Under prior law no specific authority existed in the Code or regulations
stipulating the treatment of the statutory limitation for members of a con-
trolled group.' 78 The new law allows a controlled group a single
$1,000,000 statutory limitation that may be divided among the component
members of the group on December 31 of each tax year. 79 The $1,000,000
amount is divided equally unless regulations permit an unequal allocation.
Before allocation the $1,000,000 statutory limitation must be reduced if the
total policyholder dividends and special deductions of the controlled group
175. I.R.C. § 809() (West Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 259(a)).
176. I.R.C. § 809(f)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
177. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1076.
178. Controlled groups are defined in I.R.C. § 1563(a) (1976).




Election of the alternative limitation allows a guaranteed 100% deduc-
tion for all policyholder dividends paid with respect to qualified pension
business.'81 Congress hoped this provision would not only provide parity
between the tax treatment of insured pension plans and trusteed pension
plans, but also effectuate its intent that investment income attributable to
insured pension plans be tax free, thereby allowing the insurance industry
to compete effectively for qualified pension plans. 182
C Excess Interest on Deferred Annuities
Many life insurance companies issue deferred annuity contracts, or
more specifically, fixed annuities. This type of annuity allows interest to
be credited during the deferral period at a rate in excess of the relatively
low rate currently guaranteed upon issue of the contract. The proper char-
acterization of this excess interest on deferred annuity contracts has been
an area of long-standing controversy between the insurance industry and
the IRS. The controversy centers around whether the excess interest
credited under annuity contracts should be characterized as policyholder
dividends, effectively nondeductible prior to TEFRA by a life insurance
company taxed strictly on gain from operations, or whether it is fully de-
ductible in determining gain from operations as reserve increases to pro-
vide for benefits guaranteed under the contract.
The IRS attempted to resolve a portion of this controversy in June 1982
by issuing a revenue ruling that held that amounts credited to policyholder
accounts in excess of the assumed rate of interest in the contracts are distri-
butions similar to policyholder dividends that are deemed to be immedi-
ately paid back in the form of premiums to the life insurance company.
83
As a result, the insurers' deductions for excess interest credits 184 were sub-
stantially reduced or eliminated. This position was heavily criticized by
the insurance industry as to both timing and correctness. The ruling was
widely perceived to threaten not only the continued viability of new annu-
ity insurance products, but also, to some extent, the issuing companies
themselves as competitors in the broadening financial services industry.
In order to resolve the legal uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of
excess interest in the aftermath of the IRS ruling and to provide stability in
the annuity marketplace, Congress effectively reversed the IRS position in
the case of nonqualified annuity contracts. 185 TEFRA allows a full deduc-
tion for excess interest credited under nonqualified annuity contracts, pro-
vided certain requirements are met.' 86 Under the new rules all interest
180. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(4) (West Supp. 1983).
181. Qualified pension business is defined in id § 805(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
182. TEFRA § 260(a) (amending I.R.C. § 818(h)); TEFRA § 260(b) (amending I.R.C.
§ 805(g)).
183. Rev. Rul. 82-133, 1982-2 C.B. 119, 121.
184. I.R.C. § 809(f) (West Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 259(a)).




credited under a fixed annuity contract is included in full as interest paid
in determining taxable investment income in Phase I and as required inter-
est for the purpose of determining gain from operations in Phase II if such
interest is "qualified guaranteed interest."1 87 Qualified guaranteed interest
must be determined (1) under a rate guaranteed in advance for a period
not less than twelve months or for a period ending not earlier than the
close of the taxable year in which the contract was issued, or (2) under any
formula or rate declaration, including an external index, guaranteed in ad-
vance, where the terms of the formula or rate may not be changed by the
company during the period under (1) above and are independent of the
company's investment experience. 88 In order to be a contractual guaran-
tee, the rate or formula need not be stated in the individual contract so
long as the company issuing the contract has made a commitment to pay a
rate of interest that is legally binding under state law and is enforceable by
the policyholder. In addition, the annuity contract must be a "qualified
contract." A qualified contract must (1) be nonparticipating, (2) involve
life contingencies at the time the qualified interest is credited under the
contract, (3) provide that excess interest may be credited thereunder, and
(4) not be a qualified pension contract. 8 9 TEFRA further provides that
the twelve-month guarantee rule is deemed satisfied, even though the guar-
antee is for less than twelve months, if the period does not end earlier than
the close of the taxable year in which the contract was issued. 190 This rule
permits contracts to be issued with interest guarantees that coincide with
the calendar year.
A special elective provision allows a partial deduction for excess interest
credited under a participating annuity contract, assuming the requirements
for qualified guaranteed interest treatment are met. For participating con-
tracts, the amount included as interest paid and as required interest equals
the sum of (1) all interest credited at the minimum guaranteed rate and
(2) 92.5% of any interest credited in excess of the minimum guaranteed
rate.19' Without this rule the excess interest credited to a participating de-
ferred annuity contract, which is not a section 805(d) qualifying pension
contract, might be eligible only for the 77.5% policyholder dividend deduc-
tion limitation allowed to mutual companies or 85% dividend deduction
limitation applicable to stock companies. No deduction is allowed for the
remaining 7.5% of the excess interest.
For the purpose of computing taxable investment income, qualified
guaranteed interest is taken into account separately as interest paid in de-
termining the policy and other contract liability requirements. To prevent
a double deduction in Phase I, the contractual policy interest and related
reserves are excluded from the computation of the reserve interest deduc-
187. TEFRA § 264 (adding I.R.C. § 805(0(1) (West Supp. 1983)).
188. Id
189. TEFRA § 264(b) (adding I.R.C. § 805(0(2) (West Supp. 1983)).
190. TEFRA § 264(b) (adding I.R.C. § 805(t)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1983)).
191. TEFRA § 264(b) (adding I.R.C. § 805(0(3)(A) (West Supp. 1983)).
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tion. 192 Additionally, for the purpose of computing gain or loss from oper-
ations in Phase II, a similar treatment is prescribed whereby actual
amounts of qualified guaranteed interest are treated as required interest.
This treatment of qualified guaranteed interest will have a negative effect
on the computation of the company's share of tax-exempt interest and the
dividends received deduction in Phase II. To avoid a double exclusion
under Phase II, reserves on these contracts are excluded from the reserves
that are multiplied by the assumed rate to arrive at the required interest
amount.' 93 TEFRA's changes to the tax treatment of deferred annuities
were clearly designed to alleviate the results of the 1982 revenue ruling.
This revised tax treatment also affords the life insurance industry a more
competitive stance within the financial services industry.
D. Changes in Revaluation Procedure
Partially in response to GAO recommendations, Congress reduced the
amount by which preliminary term reserves on whole life business may be
increased under the approximate revaluation method to $19 per $1,000 of
insurance in force less 1.9% of reserves under such contracts. 194 This rule
applies to qualifying reserves established under contracts entered into after
March 31, 1982.195 A company may therefore have reserve layers revalued
at both $21 and $19 per $1,000 of net amount at risk. Congress also pro-
vided a transitional rule that allowed a life insurance company that reval-
ued its reserves using the approximate revaluation method to elect the
exact revaluation method without obtaining prior consent from the IRS. 196
This provision, however, applied only to a life insurance company's first
taxable year beginning after 1981.
Definition of Whole Life Versus Term Insurance. Although not a part of the
new law, the Senate Finance Committee report questioned the treatment
of "disguised term policies" as whole life policies for reserve revaluation
purposes. The committee recognized that certain renewable term policies
eligible for, at most, revaluation at $5 per $1,000 were often being called
whole life policies so that the issuing company could claim the higher re-
valuation adjustment for insurance other than term insurance. 97 The com-
mittee specifically mentioned certain graded premium policies that do not
provide for a cash surrender value until the contract has been in force for
sixteen years or longer, but do provide for the payment of premiums com-
mensurate with a whole life policy only when the insured reaches age
eighty. While recognizing that some graded premium policies may appro-
192. I.R.C. §§ 805(c)(1), 809(a), 809(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1983) (as amended by
TEFRA § 264(c)(1)).
193. Id.
194. I.R.C. § 818(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 267(a)).
195. TEFRA § 267(b), 96 Stat. at 551.
196. I.R.C. § 818(c) (West Supp. 1983).
197. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 341, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1078.
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priately be treated as whole life policies for purposes of approximate ad-
justment, the report cited two criteria for distinguishing true whole life
policies. The policies should "either have a substantial cash surrender
value within several years after the policy is issued or level premiums
should be charged within the relatively short period of time after the policy
is issued." 198 In lieu of specifically respondingto this problem, the Senate
Finance Committee report encouraged the Treasury Department to issue
regulations addressing the graded premium policy issue.199 On November
7, 1983, the Treasury released proposed regulations regarding the graded
premium policy issue. The regulations provide that in order for a policy to
be treated as a whole life policy for revaluation purposes, it must provide
for a constant level of death benefits and endow, at the end of a specified
period or upon maturity, an amount equal to the level death benefit. In
addition, the gross premiums charged under the contract must be level
during the premium paying period unless certain requirements are met:
(1) the policy provides for a cash value which at all times is at least 75% of
the minimum required by state law for comparable policies; (2) the
reserves for the policy with respect to the endowment amount are at all
times at least equal to the minimum reserve required by state law for com-
parable policies; and (3) the gross premiums charged are level from the
end of the fifth year throughout the remainder of the premium paying
period.2°
E Additional Interest Reserves
Additional interest reserves usually arise under deferred annuity con-
tracts when interest rates are guaranteed beyond the end of the year at a
rate in excess of the maximum valuation rate allowed by state insurance
departments. TEFRA provides that no deduction will be allowed for these
additional reserves during the two-year stopgap period to the extent they
relate to interest guarantees made after July 1, 1982, and before January 1,
1984.201 The purpose of this provision is to prevent companies from accel-
erating the deduction for interest pertaining to periods after the close of a
taxable year.202
F Adjustment of the Menge Formula
In response to recommendations by the GAO and industry groups, Con-
gress changed the 10-for-I Menge formula for determining adjusted life
reserves to a geometric approximation method. As previously discussed,
the geometric approximation method assumes that for a difference of "n"
198. Id, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1079.
199. Id
200. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.818-4(h)(2). This provision will be effective for contracts is-
sued 30 days after the Treasury Decision based on these proposed regulations is published in
the Federal Register.
201. TEFRA § 263(a)(3)(A), 96 Stat. at 541.
202. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 341, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1078.
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percent between the actual and assumed earnings rates, the level of
reserves decreases by 0.9 to the nth power.20 3 The Senate Finance Com-
mittee stated that this "geometric ten-for-one" rule would better fit the ec-
onomics of the insurance industry in the current interest climate and result
in a better approximation of reserves at the prevailing higher earnings
rates. 2o4
G Consolidated Returns
A provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 states that the parent of an
affiliated group that includes one or more domestic life insurance or mu-
tual casualty companies can elect to treat all such companies as includible
corporations eligible to file a consolidated return.205 Consent to treat these
related companies as includible members was previously denied because
of the fundamental differences between methods of taxation applied to life
insurance and mutual casualty companies and the method of taxation ap-
plied to other corporations. Separate returns were therefore warranted for
related insurance companies. This reasoning had considerable merit
before 1958 when life insurance companies were taxed essentially only on
investment income. The 1959 Act, however, by adopting a total income
approach, brought life insurance company taxation more in line with the
taxation of other corporations.
A basic question in computing consolidated life insurance company tax-
able income is whether consolidation should be approached on a bottom
line or a phase-by-phase basis. In June 1982 the Treasury Department
released proposed regulations on certain issues related to life-nonlife con-
solidations. These proposed regulations embraced an approach, generally
resisted by the insurance industry, known as a "modified phase-by-phase"
consolidation method. Under this method each company's separate taxa-
ble investment income and gain or loss from operations were aggregated.
Consolidated taxable income was then computed based on consolidated
taxable investment income and consolidated gain from operations.
Before hearings could be held on the proposed regulations, Congress
enacted TEFRA, which provides a "bottom line" consolidation method
for determining life insurance company taxable income for taxable years
1982 and 1983.206 Under the bottom line method each company computes
its separate life insurance company taxable income. The separate com-
pany taxable income amounts are then combined to arrive at the consoli-
dated taxable income of the affiliated group. TEFRA did not affect the
treatment of items that are not unique to life insurance companies, such as
capital gains and losses and the deductions for charitable contributions
203. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
204. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1080.
205. I.R.C. § 1504(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
206. TEFRA § 262, 96 Stat. at 540 (amending I.R.C. § 818(f)).
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and dividends received. Those items are subject to the general consolida-
tion rules applicable to all taxpayers.
On March 14, 1983, the Treasury issued final regulations for life-nonlife
affiliated groups electing to file a consolidated federal income tax return.
Despite industry criticism of many of the provisions, the Treasury Depart-
ment adopted and finalized the proposed regulations with few revisions.
The final regulations retain the "subgroup method" of consolidation ini-
tially introduced by the proposed regulations. 20 7 This method of comput-
ing life-nonlife consolidated taxable income assumes the existence of two
subgroups within one consolidated tax return, a "nonlife subgroup" com-
prised of nonlife companies, including mutual casualty companies, and a
"life subgroup" comprised of life insurance companies.208 Subject to cer-
tain limitations on losses, consolidated taxable income for the entire group
is determined by combining the "bottom line" consolidated taxable in-
come or loss of the two subgroups. The final regulations do not, however,
specifically address the precise manner in which the consolidated taxable
income of the life subgroup should be computed. Clearly, many questions
remain unanswered, and the application of the final regulations to specific
taxpayer situations continues to be very complex.
H Policyholder Tax Treatment
The tax treatment of new investment-oriented products greatly influ-
ences their success or failure in the financial marketplace. In this area
Congress faces two objectives. First, Congress has committed itself to pro-
tect the social and economic benefits provided by these products and to
encourage savings and capital accumulation on the part of the average in-
dividual. Second, Congress must consider the effect of its decisions on
competition between the various members of the financial services indus-
try. Similar products offered by both banks and insurance companies
should be taxed equally at the policyholder/investor level.
Deferred Annuities. In recent years the life insurance industry has devel-
oped deferred annuity products that provide investment yields competitive
with short-term money market investments. Marketing of these annuities
has focused more on their effectiveness as short-term tax shelters and less
upon long-term funding. Prior law tended to assist this short-term market-
ing strategy for deferred annuity contracts by providing that annuity in-
come was not currently taxed to the policyholder. Amounts paid out
under an annuity contract prior to the starting date of the annuity were
treated first as a return of the policyholder's capital and were taxable as
ordinary income only after the policyholder had recovered his investment
in the contract.209
Congress believed that the use of deferred annuity contracts to meet
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-47(a)(2).
208. Id
209. I.R.C. § 72(e) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
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long-term investment goals, such as providing income security, should re-
ceive favorable tax treatment, but that the use of deferred annuities for
short-term investment and income tax deferral should be discouraged.
210
Because Congress enacted the prior tax rules before the advent of invest-
ment-oriented deferred annuities, a change in the law was warranted. The
new law makes two changes to the tax treatment of fixed or variable de-
ferred annuities.2 ' First, a withdrawal before the annuity starting date
will be treated as income to the extent the cash value of the contract ex-
ceeds the investment in the contract. 212 Second, policyholders incur a pen-
alty tax for certain premature distributions from annuity contracts.
213
Amounts Not Received as an Annuity. A withdrawal before the annuity
starting date, termed "an amount not received as an annuity," is treated as
income on the contract to the extent the cash value of the contract exceeds
the investment in the contract immediately before distribution.214 The
policyholder must include the amount withdrawn in taxable income to the
extent allocable to income on the contract. 215 The investment in the con-
tract is defined as the aggregate amount of premiums or other considera-
tion paid for the contract minus the aggregate amount previously received
under the contract to the extent such amount was excludable from gross
income. 216 Any amount received that is not allocable to income on the
contract is treated as allocable to the investment in the contract and is not
included in gross income.217
The new law does not provide for any netting of withdrawals and premi-
ums. A withdrawal may therefore result in taxable income even though
the withdrawal is later offset by additional premium payments. A policy-
holder dividend distributed prior to the annuity starting date is not, how-
ever, included in gross income to the extent such amount is retained by the
insurer as a premium or other consideration paid for the contract. 218 Such
amounts will, however, increase the policyholder's investment in the con-
tract. 219 The new law also provides that any direct or indirect loan under
the contract, or any assignment or pledge of any portion of the value of the
210. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 347, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1082.
211. The legislative provisions, however, failed to address the "wraparound" issues per-
taining to such contracts, leaving various unanswered questions in this area.
212. I.R.C. § 72(e) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
213. I.R.C. § 72(q) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(b)(1)).
214. I.R.C. § 72(e) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
215. I.R.C. § 72(e)(2)(B)(i) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
An amount is treated as allocable to income on the contract to the extent it does not exceed
the excess of the cash value of the contract, without regard to any surrender charge, over the
investment in the contract immediately before the amount is received. I.R.C. § 72(e)(3)(A)
(West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
216. I.R.C. § 72(e)(6) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
217. I.R.C. § 72(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
218. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
219. The policyholder's investment in the contract is defined by I.R.C. § 72(e)(6) (West
Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)) as "premiums or other consideration
paid for the contract."
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contract, is treated as a cash withdrawal rather than a true loan. 220 In
consequence, a policyholder will receive income to the extent the amount
of the loan, assignment, or pledge is allocable to income on the contract.
Presumably, repayments on any policy loans will correspondingly be re-
classified as additional policy premiums, thereby increasing the policy-
holder's investment in the contract.
The existing rules are retained in certain cases. Most importantly, the
new rules do not apply to contracts entered into before August 14, 1982.221
Nonetheless, any amount allocable to the investment in the contract after
August 13, 1982, is treated as derived from a contract entered into after
such date.222 The amount allocable to the investment in the contract after
August 13, 1982, is apparently intended to be computed first with respect
to the most recent investments under the contract, although TEFRA does
not explicitly provide for this treatment.
Penalty Tax. Congressional intent to discourage the use of deferred annui-
ties for short-term investment and income tax deferral is apparent in a new
rule that provides for a 5% penalty for certain premature distributions
from annuity contracts.223 The penalty tax equals 5% of the amount of the
distribution includible in the policyholder's gross income that is properly
allocable to any investment in the annuity contract made during the ten-
year period ending on the date of the distribution.224 For purposes of
determining whether an amount is allocable to an investment in the annu-
ity contract made during the prior ten years, the amount includible in gross
income is allocated to the earliest investment in the contract. 225
The penalty tax is expressly inapplicable to certain distributions. The
penalty tax will not apply to any distribution made on or after the date on
which the policyholder attains age 59 , or to a distribution that is one of a
series of substantially equal periodic payments made for life or for a pe-
riod of at least sixty months after the annuity starting date.226 Further, the
penalty will not apply if the withdrawal follows the death of the policy-
holder or is attributable to the policyholder's becoming disabled. 227 Fi-
nally, the penalty does not apply to any distribution from a qualified
plan.228
The penalty tax provisions do not apply to contracts entered into before
August 14, 1982.229 Any amount allocable to premiums paid for annuities
220. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
221. TEFRA § 265(c)(1), 96 Stat. at 547.
222. I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(a)).
223. I.R.C. § 72(q) (as amended by TEFRA § 265(b)(1)).
224. The penalty was 10% under the original Senate bill, but was reduced to 5% in con-
ference. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 647, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1190, 1416.
225. TEFRA § 265(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. § 72(q)(1)(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983)).
226. TEFRA § 265(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. §§ 72(q)(2)(A)-(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983)).
227. TEFRA § 265(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. §§ 72(q)(2)(B)-(C) (West Pam. Supp. 1983)).
228. TEFRA § 265(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(E) (West Pam. Supp. 1983)).
229. TEFRA § 265(b)(1) (adding I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(F) (West Pam. Supp. 1983)).
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after August 13, 1982, is treated for this purpose as received from a con-
tract entered into after that date. The penalty tax provisions do not, how-
ever, apply to distributions made before January 1, 1983.
I. Flexible Premium Life Insurance Contracts
In recent years many life insurance companies have begun marketing
flexible premium'Iife insurance contracts known as "universal life" or "ad-
justable life" contracts. These policies permit the policyholder to change
the amount and timing of the premiums and the amount of the death ben-
efits. Under these contracts the death benefit may or may not bear any
relation to the cash value of the policy.
A 1981 private letter ruling to E.F. Hutton Life Insurance Company
held that the death benefit under its universal life insurance product, a
flexible premium life insurance contract, would be excluded from taxable
income as proceeds of a life insurance contract.230 The ruling allows the
earnings on the investment portion of the contract to accumulate tax-free
unless the contract is surrendered before the death of the insured. A
policyholder could therefore enjoy an unlimited amount of tax deferred
savings. The IRS later announced that it was reconsidering its position on
the treatment of flexible premium life insurance contracts.23'
Because the uncertain tax treatment of flexible premium contracts
caused significant confusion among both consumers and life insurance
companies, Congress believed the tax treatment of these contracts should
be resolved by legislation.232 In TEFRA Congress provided specific
guidelines that a flexible premium life insurance contract must meet in
order to be treated as a traditional life insurance policy for tax purposes. 233
If these guidelines are violated at any time during the life of the contract,
the death benefit will be taxable income to the beneficiary to the extent the
amount received exceeds the investment in the contract.
The new law defines a flexible premium life insurance contract as one
that provides for the payment of one or more premiums that are not fixed
by the insurer as to both timing and amount.234 The term also includes
contracts with riders for so-called qualified additional benefits, which in-
clude guaranteed insurability, accidental death, family term coverage, and
waiver of premium.235 A contract providing any annuity benefits other
than settlement options, or any single premium life insurance contract, is
not considered a flexible premium life insurance contract. In order to
qualify for tax-free receipt by the beneficiary of death benefits, a flexible
premium life contract must at all times meet one of two separate tests, the
guideline premium limitation test or the cash value test.
230. Ltr. Rul. 8116073 (Jan. 23, 1981).
231. Ltr. Rul. 8236069 (June 11, 1982).
232. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 352, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 781.
233. I.R.C. § 101(f) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).




Guideline Premium Limitation. Under this test two conditions must be sat-
isfied. First, the sum of the premiums paid under the contract must not at
any time exceed the guideline premium limitation. 236 Briefly, the guide-
line premium limitation is the guideline single premium or the sum of the
guideline level premiums. The guideline single premium is the single pre-
mium necessary at issue to fund the future benefits provided under the
contract, based on the mortality and other charges fixed in the contract,
plus interest at the greater of an annual effective rate of 6% or the mini-
mum rate or rates guaranteed on issue of the contract. 237 The guideline
level premium is the annual amount payable over the longest period per-
mitted under the contract, which may not be less than 20 years from the
date of issue or, if earlier, until age 95. The amount is computed on the
same basis as the guideline single premium except that the interest rate
used is the greater of an annual effective rate of 4% or the minimum rate or
rates guaranteed under the contract at issue.238
The second condition requires that the death benefit not at any time be
less than the applicable percentage of the cash value of the contract. 239
The applicable percentage is defined as 140% of the cash value when the
insured, at the beginning of the contract year, is age 40 or less. When the
insured is over 40 at the beginning of the contract year, the applicable
percentage is 140% reduced, but not below 105%, by 1% for each year in
excess of age 40.240
Cash Value Test. The second test is the cash value test.241 Under this test
the cash value of a contract cannot at any time exceed the net single pre-
mium for the death benefit at such time. The net single premium must be
computed using the most current mortality table, an interest rate equal to
the greater of 4% or the minimum guaranteed interest rate, and a maturity
date not earlier than age 95.242
The provisions on flexible premium life insurance contracts apply to
contracts entered into before January 1, 1984.243 For any contract entered
into before January 1, 1983, there is a one-year grace period from the date
of enactment to bring the contract into compliance with the new law. Dur-
ing the grace period any death benefit paid under a flexible premium life
insurance contract is excluded from taxable income.
. Summary
Although TEFRA was designed to be only a temporary solution to the
problem of insurance company taxation, it did permanently address some
236. I.R.C. § 101(f)(1)(A)(i) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
237. I.R.C. § 101(f)(2)(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
238. I.R.C. § 101(0(2)(C) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
239. I.R.C. § 101(f)(1)(A)(ii) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
240. I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(C) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
241. I.R.C. § 101(f)(1)(B) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
242. I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(G) (West Pam. Supp. 1983) (as amended by TEFRA § 266(a)).
243. TEFRA § 266(c)(1), 96 Stat. at 550.
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of the problems inherent in the 1959 Act. For example, the TEFRA ad-
justments to the Menge formula and to the limitation on policyholder divi-
dends and special deductions reflect Congress's awareness of changes in
the economic climate. In addition, TEFRA at least initially addressed the
tax treatment of new investment-oriented products and the vanishing dis-
tinctions between members of the financial services industry. The TEFRA
legislation also evidenced Congress's desire to raise additional revenue and
indicated that the life insurance industry, among others, was viewed by
legislators as a prime source of that additional tax revenue.
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE 1959 ACT
Because the stopgap legislation included as part of TEFRA expires at
the end of 1983, Congress must replace it with either some form of perma-
nent legislation or additional stopgap legislation. Several industry groups,
the Treasury, and Congress have been examining life insurance company
taxation and have promulgated several alternative tax proposals. Due to
the apparent divergence of opinion within the industry and the complexity
of many of the issues, an eventual compromise on permanent tax legisla-
tion will not come easily or expeditiously. Because of current budgetary
problems, however, Congress will almost certainly not allow existing stop-
gap legislation to be extended without a "toll charge."'244 This toll charge
could take the form of a decreased limitation on special deductions, a de-
crease in the approximate revaluation figures for computing net level
reserves, or some other tax increase measure.
With the stopgap measures enacted as part of TEFRA expiring at the
end of the year, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Rev-
enue Measures began working on permanent legislation. The subcommit-
tee, chaired by the Honorable Fortney H. (Pete) Stark (D-California), held
hearings on May 10 and 11, 1983, on the tax treatment of life insurance
companies and their products. Although the subcommittee had not yet
formulated a specific proposal, it did identify the major issues. The hear-
ings also indicated that a significant split still existed within the industry.
Notably, this split between mutual and stock companies closely resembled
the split that occurred at the time of the 1959 Act.
The split within the industry was already very apparent prior to the en-
actment of the TEFRA stopgap legislation. Prominent industry groups
such as the ACLI, which Congress and the Treasury typically look to for
industry input into the legislative process, failed to reach a consensus on
any proposed legislation because of the split between stock and mutual
companies. Out of these groups several informal organizations were
formed. Among these were the Stock Information Group, an association
244. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Illinois),
speaking at a life insurance meeting in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1983, indicated that a
"toll charge" may be imposed if another set of temporary rules has to be enacted. He indi-
cated that any new stopgap proposals would be harsher than the present stopgap provisions
due to the budgetary situation.
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of 120 stock companies, and the Mutual Company Executive Committee, a
group of executives from certain large mutual companies. These informal
groups developed several alternative proposals regarding the future taxa-
tion of insurance companies. Subsequently, Representative Stark and
Representative Henson Moore (R-Louisiana) made public a specific pro-
posal. Known as the Stark-Moore proposal, this measure was designed to
simplify the present tax structure applicable to life insurance companies by
replacing the three-phase tax system with a single-phase system. While the
subcommittee acknowledged that the proposal needed considerable refine-
ment, it represented a starting point for debate by Congress, the Treasury,
and the industry. On July 28, 1983, the subcommittee held additional
hearings to elicit public testimony on the Stark-Moore proposal. Again the
controversy between mutual and stock companies was evident. Ulti-
mately, on October 3, 1983, Representative Stark introduced to the House
Ways and Means Committee the Life Insurance Tax Act of 1983
(LITA),245 which, with a few exceptions, parallels the Stark-Moore propo-
sal. This legislation, which was unanimously approved by the subcommit-
tee and approved with minor changes by the full House Ways and Means
Committee on October 5, 1983, represents an insurance industry compro-
mise that is somewhat tentative but, at least through the Ways and Means
Committee, is supported by all segments of the industry. At the time of the
writing of this article, LITA is being considered by the full House of Rep-
resentatives as a part of an overall comprehensive tax reform package.246
The following discussion considers some of the major issues currently be-
ing examined by the Congress, the Treasury, and the industry.
A. Mutual Versus Stock Companies
As in 1959, the primary concern among both mutual and stock compa-
nies is maintenance of a competitive balance between the two. This con-
cern raises the issue of the tax treatment of policyholder dividends under
participating policies. Stock companies generally contend that some dif-
ferential in the tax treatment of stock and mutual companies is essential to
secure this competitive balance. 247 The stock companies argue that some
portion of mutual company earnings actually represents a return on equity
that should be taxed similar to stock company return on equity.
Mutual companies contend that the tax treatment of policyholder divi-
dends should be the same for both mutual and stock companies. The mu-
tual companies believe that any difference in treatment would impose a
penalty on the mutual form of organization and grant special tax incen-
tives for the stock form of organization. 248 The mutual companies also
245. H.R. 4065, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
246. H.R. 4071, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
247. This differential is often referred to as the "ownership differential." Absent any
pertinent legislation, mutual companies could "dividend" out their profits to their policy-
holder-owners on a deductible basis and thus escape corporate tax on the profits.
248. A memorandum entitled "The Case Against a Mutual/Stock Organization" stated
that any differential between mutual and stock companies is negligible because (1) any re-
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point out that the decision in 1959 to limit deductions for policyholder
dividends and to create special deductions for stock companies was made
at a time when mutual companies clearly dominated the life insurance in-
dustry in terms of assets and in force amounts. Since 1959 the dominance
of mutual companies has declined and thus the social, economic, and
political pressures to maintain a competitive balance within the industry
through differential tax treatment have disappeared.
Industry groups, Treasury officials, and others generally recognize two
basic methods of limiting the deductibility of policyholder dividends by
mutual companies. The first method imposes a limitation on the deduct-
ibility of dividends for all companies. This method resembles the TEFRA
stopgap legislation that provides generally that dividends are deductible at
a rate of 77.5% for mutual companies and 85% for stock companies.249
Perhaps not surprisingly, stock companies argue that the 7.5% difference is
too small, while the mutual companies argue that the differential is much
too large. While the use of any such percentages is a simple means of
achieving a balance between the two industry segments, industry observers
have criticized this approach because it provides Congress or the Treasury
a convenient rheostat that can easily be adjusted in order to obtain more
revenue from the life insurance industry as a whole. 250 In addition, any
limitation on the deductibility of policyholder dividends necessitates defi-
nition of precisely what items constitute policyholder dividends. Question-
able items include excess interest, premium refunds and adjustments,
indeterminate premiums, experience refunds, retrospective rate credits,
and additional benefits as a result of a policy change.
The second recognized method, and the method proposed in LITA, is
the imputation of some form of mutual company adjustment to reflect the
ownership differential. Under this method, notwithstanding any such mu-
tual company adjustment, policyholder dividends would be fully deducti-
ble. The mutual company adjustment would be equal to earnings imputed
on an average equity base and would approximate the equity element of
any policyholder dividend. The equity base is a difficult term to define,
however. Some proponents argue that it should equal statutory surplus,
plus certain adjustments; others contend that it should approximate some
form of tax surplus. Under LITA, the equity base of a mutual insurance
company is equal to its capital and surplus, plus adjustments for items
such as nonadmitted financial assets and the excess of statutory reserves
turn on equity in a mutual company is relatively small, (2) any current tax structure that
retains gain from operations as part of its tax base contains a built-in differential tax on
mutual companies because a portion of the premiums received by mutual companies repre-
sents contributions to equity and is included in income, and (3) any tax imposed on mutual
company policyholders for equity dividends would be de minimus due in part to the $200
exclusion for dividends received by individuals. T. Groom & M. Zinn, The Case Against a
Mutual/Stock Organization 2 (Jan. 12, 1983).
249. These rates are a part of the alternative limitation on policyholder dividends and
special deductions. See I.R.C. § 809(f)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1983).
250. These views are reflected in certain reports prepared for the ACLI Steering
Committee.
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over tax reserves. The average equity base on which the differential earn-
ings amount is computed is the average of the equity bases determined as
of the close of the current year and the preceding year. In addition, the
determination of an appropriate earnings rate causes concern in many seg-
ments of the industry. Among the alternatives suggested are the statutory
investment earnings rate,25' an industry rate equal to the average rate of
stock company shareholder dividends increased by the average taxes paid
by the stockholders, or some other industry-wide rate determined by the
IRS. Many industry leaders feel that this approach is weak because it re-
quires a determination of earnings that is both arbitrary and difficult.
Moreover, under LITA the earnings rate used in computing the policy-
holder dividend limitation is the excess of an imputed earnings rate over
an average earnings rate for a specified year. In 1984 the imputed earnings
rate is 16.5%. After 1984, however, the rate is based on a formula that
takes into account the earnings of the fifty largest stock life insurance
companies. 25 2
The members of the subcommittee perceive another problem regarding
the stock versus mutual form of organization. Specifically, the subcom-
mittee contends that mutual companies could derive an undue benefit by
operating through one or more stock subsidiaries. The Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy, John E. Chapoton, voiced the general con-
cern with respect to the potential for tax avoidance where mutual compa-
nies form stock company subsidiaries.
If stock subsidiaries of mutual companies were permitted to pay and
deduct policyholder dividends without regard to any minimum tax
base, these stock subsidiaries could gain an unfair competitive advan-
tage over their publicly-owned stock company competitors since they
would be allowed to make tax deductible distributions of a portion of
their profits to policyholders, in their capacity as equity owners. Un-
like true stock companies, there would be no corporate tax except to
the extent the stock subsidiary retained its earnings rather than dis-
tributing them to its policyholders in their capacity as equity
owners.
253
Under the original Stark-Moore proposal a mutual company's eighty per-
cent owned stock subsidiaries were treated as mutual companies. Mutual
251. The statutory earnings rate is published annually in Exhibit II of the NAIC Annual
Statements.
252. LITA is designed to raise an estimated $2.8 billion in tax revenues from the life
insurance industry in 1984 with the industry tax burden split approximately 55%-45% be-
tween the mutual and stock life insurance companies. In order to assure that the segment
shares of the industry's tax burden are appropriate, the Treasury Department is directed to
conduct a study during 1984, 1985, and 1986 on the operation of the provisions of LITA.
This study is intended to look at the portion of the industry's taxes actually paid by the
mutual and stock companies and will also analyze the amount of items, such as life insur-
ance reserves, pension business, equity, total assets, and gross receipts, among others, that
are held by each segment. The Treasury Department must complete the study and report its
findings to Congress no later than Jan. 1, 1989.
253. Statement of The Honorable John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy, before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means (July 28, 1983).
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companies argue that the policyholders of a stock subsidiary are not its
owners, and therefore no ownership differential should be applied to a
stock subsidiary. Apparently in order to win the support of the mutual
segment of the industry, Representative Stark's subcommittee later re-
versed its initial position on stock subsidiaries. The provision eventually
incorporated into LITA treats stock subsidiaries as stock companies for tax
purposes. However, the mutual company parent must include the stock
subsidiary in the determination of its average equity base. Thus, the taxa-
ble status of the subsidiary (as a stock company) is preserved, but the po-
tential benefits for policyholder dividends at the mutual company parent's
level may be diminished due to the inclusion of its capital and surplus and
other items in the mutual company parent's average equity base.
B. Deferral Mechanisms Within the Three-Phase System
The GAO Report and Treasury officials have called for an end to the
deferral of 50% of the excess of gain from operations over taxable invest-
ment income. In addition, certain proposed alternatives to the present tax
structure eliminate special deductions for nonparticipating contracts and
accident and health and group life contracts that also create a deferral of
tax for stock companies. Proponents of these changes note that the fram-
ers of the 1959 Act created these deferral mechanisms to provide a cushion
against future catastrophic losses that, based upon industry experience, has
not been necessary. Opponents of the proposal to eliminate these deferral
mechanisms argue that such a cushion for future contingencies is in fact
needed and that the elimination of these items could pose a stock/mutual
balance problem. The elimination of the deferral mechanisms also raises
the issue of how the current deferral amounts accumulated in policyholder
surplus accounts should be taxed. Proposed solutions range from total for-
giveness to immediate taxation.
LITA calls for a single-phase tax scheme, thus eliminating the 50%
deferral of excess gain from operations over taxable investment income,
and also calls for elimination of the special deductions for nonparticipat-
ing policies and accident and health and group policies. Under LITA, the
amounts in the policyholders' surplus accounts are still subject to tax in the
future. These amounts are included in income under circumstances simi-
lar to those under the 1959 Act. 25 4
254. In order to determine whether a Phase III tax is incurred in the future, LITA re-
quires that each life insurance company continue to maintain both its shareholders' surplus
account (SSA) and its policyholders' surplus account (PSA). Similar to present law, subse-
quent additions will be made to the SSA and distributions to shareholders will be treated as
made first from the SSA.
The yearly addition to the SSA will be the excess of the sum of the following items over
the taxes paid for the year:
(1) Life Insurance Company taxable income (determined without regard to
any distributions from the PSA);
(2) the taxable income adjustment;
(3) the small company deduction;
(4) the deduction for intercorporate dividends received; and
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C Reserves
Another area of concern on the part of Congress and the Treasury in-
volves the issue of reserves. In a letter to the ACLI president in early 1983
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert J. Dole (R-Kansas) raised
three issues regarding reserve accounting for tax purposes: (1) the appro-
priate method of accounting for current liabilities; (2) the propriety of stat-
utory accounting pursuant to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners' (NAIC's) promulgations; and (3) the continuing justifica-
tion for revaluation of reserves. 255
With regard to revaluation of reserves to a net level basis, the GAO
Report recommends merely that the approximate revaluation formula be
adjusted from $21 to $15 per $1,000 of insurance in force to reflect more
realistic net level reserves. The Treasury Department contends that the
approximate revaluation method should be abandoned altogether. 256 The
Treasury Department later stated that it believes that both preliminary
term and net level reserves as reported on NAIC annual statements were
overstated and that an alternative method of computing reserves should be
adopted.2 57 The insurance industry has rejected this proposal on the
grounds that federal tax law has historically recognized reserves required
by state regulations and that any other method of computing reserves
would ignore this prior treatment. Certain industry spokesmen further
contend that elimination of the net level adjustment would allow large,
well-financed companies to gain a competitive advantage over smaller
companies.
One of the major changes that would be made by LITA involves the
computation of life insurance reserves. As under present law, a life insur-
ance company continues to deduct reserve increases from income and con-
tinues to include reserve decreases in income. However, unlike present
law, LITA mandates a new method to be used in computing or measuring
the reserve. In general, the applicable reserve would be the higher of the
net surrender value of the contract or the reserve determined by means of
a formula. However, in no event would the reserve exceed the amount
taken into account in determining statutory reserves. The term "net sur-
render value" is defined as the cash surrender value of the policy reduced
by any surrender penalty. The formula approach would consist of the
following:
(5) excluded tax-exempt interest.
For the PSA, no additions would be made to this account for taxable years that begin after
December 31, 1983. Therefore, in most cases, the PSA will be frozen at its December 31,
1983, balance and will be subject to reduction if distributions exceed the SSA balance or
another triggering event occurs.
255. Senator Dole's statements are published in BEST'S INSURANCE MANAGEMENT RE-
PORTS, Release No. 6 (Mar. 21, 1983).
256. Statement of The Honorable John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy, before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means (May 10, 1983).
257. Statement of The Honorable John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy (July 28, 1983).
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(1) The tax reserve method applicable to the contract--generally this
would be the Commissioners' Reserve Valuation Method for life
insurance contracts, the Commissioners' Annuities Reserve Valua-
tion Method for annuity contracts, or a two-year full preliminary
term method for noncancellable accident and health contracts;
(2) the highest assumed interest rate permitted by twenty-six states for
computing reserves for a life insurance or an annuity contract at
the time the contract is issued; and
(3) the most recent commissioner's standard tables permitted under the
insurance laws of twenty-six states at the time the contract is issued.
The proposed reserving method is applicable to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1983. In making the change to the new reserving
method, all life insurance reserves as of the beginning of the first taxable
year covered by the proposed new method would be revalued. For exam-
ple, for a calendar year life insurance company, the life insurance reserves
as of January 1, 1984, would have to be revalued to the new reserving
method. 258 In the vast majority of instances, the reserve revaluation re-
quired by LITA will result in life insurance reserves as of the beginning of
the first year covered by LITA lower than the closing reserves as of the end
of the preceding year. This will be particularly true for life insurance com-
panies that have made an election under section 818(c). The difference
between the old and the new reserves does not, however, have to be in-
cluded in income. LITA takes a fresh start approach so that life insurance
companies will not have to recapture these previously deducted reserve
increases into income, regardless of amount. Thus, the entire difference is
forgiven.
In anticipation that some insurance companies may attempt to abuse the
fresh start approach, LITA, in effect, places a moratorium on certain rein-
surance agreements. The fresh start concept does not apply to any life
insurance reserves transferred pursuant to a reinsurance agreement en-
tered into, modified, or terminated after September 27, 1983. Insurance
companies are not, therefore, able to benefit from the fresh start approach
for reserve increases attributable to reinsurance agreements after Septem-
ber 27, 1983. In this situation, an assuming company must include the
reserve difference in income ratably over a ten-year period beginning in
1984. It is important to note that this inclusion in income may not be
taken into account for purposes of computing the two new special life in-
surance company deductions discussed below. The effect of this rule is
that this income will be taxed at the full corporate tax rate of 46%.
D. The Defnition of Life Insurance
Another issue involved in considerable debate concerns the defirtition of
258. This regulation will result in a significant administrative burden for life insurance
companies due to the fact that they will have to isolate for the year of issue the various
factors, such as the prevailing interest rate and commissioners' standard table, considered in
the computation of the reserve.
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life insurance. While government and industry officials agree that new
permanent legislation should contain provisions defining life insurance,
uncertainty exists with regard to how the term should be defined. LITA
provides alternative tests for determining whether an insurance product
constitutes life insurance. One alternative deals with a cash value accumu-
lation test, while the second alternative involves a guideline premium limi-
tation test and a cash value corridor test. The cash value accumulation test
is intended to allow traditional whole life policies with cash values that
accumulate based on reasonable interest rates to continue to qualify as life
insurance contracts. This test can, therefore, be satisfied if the cash surren-
der value of the contract does not exceed the net single premium that
would be paid to fund future benefits. In general, in making this test, the
single net premium will be computed using the greater of a 4% annual
effective rate of interest or the rate guaranteed when the contract is issued.
The second alternative test has two requirements, a guideline premium
test and a cash value test. The guideline premium test distinguishes be-
tween contracts that are funded on a traditional level premium payment
basis and those that involve greater investments by the policyholder. The
cash value test disqualifies any contract that builds up excessive amounts
of cash value in relation to the life insurance risk. In combination, these
requirements tend to limit the definition of life insurance to contracts that
require modest investment and yield a modest investment return. A con-
tract can satisfy the guideline premium test if the sum of the premiums
does not exceed the guideline premium limitation. Basically, the premium
limitation is the greater of the guideline single premium or the sum of the
guideline level premiums. The cash value test can be satisfied if the death
benefit at any time is equal to a percentage, supplied in a table contained
in LITA, of the cash surrender value. In general, the applicable percent-
ages begin at 250% for an insured who is less than 40 years of age and
decreases to 100% for an insured who is 95 years of age.
If a contract fails to meet the definition of life insurance at any time, the
pure insurance portion of the contract, the difference between the face
amount and the cash surrender value, will be treated as term life insur-
ance. The cash surrender value will be treated as a deposit fund and in-
come earned on the fund would be taxable currently. In addition, all
income previously deferred will be included in the insured's income in the
year the contract fails to qualify as a life insurance contract. The new
definition applies only to contracts issued or exchanged after December 31,
1983.
E. The Small Life Insurance Company Deduction
Since enactment of the 1959 Act legislators have recognized the plight of
the small insurance company in an industry traditionally dominated by
large companies. As previously discussed, the 1959 Act specifically pro-
vided a deduction to benefit small companies. Under LITA small compa-
nies can deduct 60% of their first $3,000,000 of tentative life insurance
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company taxable income (LICTI).259 The deduction is gradually phased
out as tentative LICTI reaches $15,000,000. No deduction is allowed to
companies whose assets, generally determined on a fair market value basis,
exceed $500,000,000. The asset limitations are determined on a controlled
group basis, including both insurance and noninsurance members. The
tentative LICTI test is also made on a controlled group basis, such that all
the life insurance companies in the group are treated as one company. 260
F The Special Life Insurance Company Deduction
When the original version of the Stark-Moore proposal was being devel-
oped, the potential existed for the insurance industry to bear a dispropor-
tionately large tax burden when compared to other financial
intermediaries. In order to reduce or eliminate this disparity, the concept
of a taxable income adjustment (TIA) was developed in the original Stark-
Moore proposal and has been carried over into LITA. The special life
insurance company deduction (still commonly referred to as the TIA) is an
adjustment equal to 25% of tentative LICTI. Similar to the small company
deduction, tentative LICTI for purposes of the TIA is computed on a con-
trolled group basis and excludes noninsurance trade or business income,
except when the income is from a noninsurance trade or business that is
typically carried on by a life insurance company. The TIA is made after
the small company deduction. Therefore, a life insurance company cannot
qualify for a small company deduction by reducing its tentative LICTI by
the TIA first. However, the TIA is not limited or phased out like the small
company deduction.
Industry spokesmen and others have argued that the novel concept of
the TIA is indicative of flaws within the new tax legislation. Additionally,
the TIA has been criticized as being a convenient target in future years if
additional tax revenues are needed from the industry.
G. Method of Accounting
As under present law, the federal income tax accrual method of account-
ing generally is required to be used by life insurance companies under
259. Tentative LICTI is determined without regard to the taxable income adjustment or
the small company deduction. In addition, tentative LICTI is reduced by the amount of the
net capital gain.
260. The tentative LICTI test also is made on a controlled group basis so all life insur-
ance companies in the group are treated as one company. Tentative LICTI, however, is
determined without regard to the income from noninsurance trade or business activities un-
less the trade or business if of the type typically carried on by an insurance company for
investment purposes. Thus, if a life insurance company is also engaged in a manufacturing
activity, the income from such a trade or business is some type of activity normally con-
ducted by an insurance company for investment purposes, income from the trade or business
would be included in tentative LICTI. Examples of businesses typically carried on by a life
insurance company would include the ownership and rental of real estate or the develop-
ment and sale of real estate. It should be noted that, while the manufacturing activity men-
tioned above would not be included in the tentative LICTI test, the assets of that activity
would be included in the assets test for the small company deduction.
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LITA. However, LITA attempts to resolve any doubt that federal income
tax accrual accounting rules have primacy over state statutory accounting
rules. If state rules are inconsistent with federal rules, the federal accrual
accounting rules must be followed.261
H Life Insurance Company Defined
The definition of a life insurance company in LITA generally parallels
that contained in present law. Therefore, a life insurance company would
be an insurance company that has ife insurance reserves, or unearned pre-
miums and unpaid losses on noncancellable life, accident, or health poli-
cies not included in life insurance reserves, that comprise more than 50%
of its total reserves.
LITA, however, makes two changes to present law. First, the company
must satisfy a new statutory definition of an "insurance company." An
"insurance company" is defined as a company that has more than half of
its business activity during the year in the issuing of insurance or annuity
contracts or the reinsuring of risk underwritten by insurance companies.
The "more than half" requirement is a facts and circumstances test that
will take into account factors such as the employees, the space allocation,
and the net income of the business activities being conducted. Second,
amounts set aside to satisfy obligations under contraqs that do not contain
permanent guarantees with respect to life, accident, or health contingencies
are not included in life insurance reserves or total reserves. Thus, amounts
set aside for such contracts cannot be included in determining whether the
company is a life insurance company.
I Policyholder Loans
LITA limits the amount of interest that may be deducted by policyhold-
ers on policyholder loans. Specifically, the interest deduction is disallowed
if the rate at which interest is paid or accrued exceeds the rate charged by
the IRS on income tax deficiencies. 262 Additionally, the deduction is disal-
lowed if it exceeds $250,000 for an individual return ($500,000 for a joint
return) and $500,000 times the number of qualified lives for a corporation.
These interest limitations apply only to policies issued after September 27,
1983.
261. In an explanation of the Stark-Moore proposal that was drafted by the subcommit-
tee staff, it was indicated that this federal accrual accounting primacy rule was intended to
reverse the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
433 U.S. 148 (1977). According to the subcommittee's explanation, the effect of this rule as it
relates to the Standard Life case is to disallow as a deduction a reserve for any item unless
the gross amount of the premiums and other consideration attributable to such item are
required to be included in income. Thus, because deferred and uncollected premiums for a
contract do not accrue as income under the accrual method of accounting, the reserves re-
lated to these items may not be recognized until the premiums are taken into income, i.e.,
when they are received in cash.




In formulating a new system of taxation for insurance companies, Con-
gress should consider the complex and changing environment of the new
financial services industry. The life insurance industry is only one player
in the new financial services game. Changing consumer demands, regula-
tions, technology, market conditions, and competition are forcing life in-
surance companies to compete not only with other life insurers, but also
with other providers of financial services. The various members of the
financial services industry are becoming more integrated and distinctions
among them are fading. One-step financial shopping and full integration
of financial services are already available to consumers. Congress must
recognize that any change in the taxation of the life insurance industry
must leave it on an equal competitive level with other competitors in the
financial services industry.
Any new tax legislation must have the flexibility to provide predictable
and reasonable results despite changes in the economy. Specifically, any
new scheme of taxation should not discourage growth, expansion, or writ-
ing of new business in a period of great economic growth. Insurance com-
panies are regulated by state insurance commissions and therefore must
follow conservative statutory accounting principles in preparing annual
statements that are filed with the state insurance commissioner. These
conservative statutory accounting principles are designed to insure the sol-
vency of the insurance company and its ability to pay claims to policyhold-
ers. Any proposed tax reform should not result in a tax burden that would
make an insurance company insolvent for statutory accounting purposes
nor should it encourage insurance companies to adopt reserve or account-
ing methods that will impair its financial viability. Additionally, Congress
has traditionally recognized the inherent differences in the stock versus
mutual form of organization. Because of the competition between stock
and mutual insurance companies, any tax scheme should recognize the dif-
ferences in these forms of organization and should not upset the competi-
tive balance between the two.
Finally, Congress should design a tax scheme that can be properly ad-
ministered. The current tax structure for all taxpayers is based on self-
assessment. Congress must design an insurance tax scheme that can be
followed by even small and unsophisticated insurance companies. If the
tax structure is too complicated for insurers to understand, the degree of
compliance will be adversely affected.
To summarize, the framers of any new tax law must consider the
following:
(1) the unique long-term nature of the life insurance business;
(2) the social and economic benefits provided by life insurance;
(3) the most fair and equitable means of obtaining additional revenue,
not only from various other industries but also from the life insur-
ance industry itself;
(4) the need for tax legislation that provides for predictable and rea-
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sonable results in response to changes within the national and in-
ternational economy;
(5) the maintenance of a competitive balance within the life insurance
industry, specifically between the stock and mutual companies;
(6) the maintenance of a competitive balance between the members of
the financial services industry; and
(7) the ease with which the taxing scheme can be administered in a
self-assessment taxing system.
Congress should examine the history of life insurance taxation to deter-
mine how prior legislation either met or failed to meet these established
objectives.
The method of taxing life insurance companies in the future remains in
doubt. Certain barriers, specifically the stock versus mutual controversy,
must be overcome. Nevertheless, the success or failure, and in turn the
longevity, of any permanent reform in the taxation of life insurance com-
panies depends on the ability of Congress, the Treasury, and industry
groups to reach a satisfactory compromise that recognizes the unique na-
ture of the life insurance industry and its role within the larger financial
services industry, the economy, and society as a whole.
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